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Aristotle and the People:  
Vernacular Philosophy in Renaissance Italy1
Marco Sgarbi
Università Ca’ Foscari
The essay focuses on vernacular Aristotelianism in Renaissance Italy, which began to gain currency 
in the 1540s, just as the vernacular was beginning to establish itself as a language of culture and 
the Counter-Reformation was getting underway. With over three hundred printed and manuscript 
works, the statistics of this phenomenon are impressive. Even so, the vulgarization of Aristotle in the 
Italian Renaissance has never received the scholarly attention it deserves. The paper examines (1) the 
identity of the recipients of Aristotle’s vulgarizations, (2) the meaning of the process of vulgarization, 
and (3) the conception of knowledge that such writings brought to the culture of the Cinquecento. 
The purpose is to show that (1) vernacular renderings of Aristotle’s works were aimed at the “people,” 
including “idiots” (men lacking culture or knowledge of Latin), “simpletons,” “ignorants,” and “illit-
erates” as well as princes, men of letters, women, and children, (2) vulgarization was not simply a 
matter of disseminating, simplifying, and trivializing knowledge, and (3) vulgarization upheld the 
notion of widespread knowledge.
L’article se concentre sur l’aristotélisme vernaculaire en Italie de la Renaissance, qui s’est grandement 
développé au cours des années 1540, au moment où la langue vernaculaire s’est imposée comme 
langue de culture alors que la Contre-Réforme débutait. Avec plus que quatre cent œuvres imprimées 
ou manuscrites, les chiffres de ce phénomène sont impressionants. Malgré tout, la vulgarisation 
d’Aristote pendant la Renaissance italienne n’a jamais reçu l’attention savante qu’elle mérite. 
L’article examine 1) l’identité des destinataires des vulgarisations d’Aristote 2) le sens du processus 
de vulgarisation, et 3) la conception de la connaissance que représentent ces textes dans la culture 
de Cinquecento. L’objectif est de démontrer que les traductions vernaculaires des œuvres d’Aristote 
s’adressaient au peuple, y compris les “simples” (les hommes sans culture ni connaissance du latin), 
les nigauds, les ignares, et les illettrés ainsi que les princes, les hommes de lettres, les femmes, et les 
enfants, 2) la vulgarisation n’était pas une affaire simple de dissémination,qui simplifie et fait circuler 
le savoir, et 3) la vulgarisation sert l’ambition d’une circulation des savoirs.
1. I gratefully acknowledge the help and suggestions of Alessio Cotugno, Gigliola Fragnito, and Laura 
Refe during the writing of this paper. This research has been possible thanks to the ERC Starting 
Grant 2013, n. 335949, “Aristotle in the Italian Vernacular: Rethinking Renaissance and Early-Modern 
Intellectual History (c. 1400–c. 1650),” http://aristotleinthevernacular.org. 
60 Marco Sgarbi
1. Vernacular Aristotelianism in Renaissance Italy
It is customary in historiographical and philosophical research to disregard ver-
nacular philosophy in Renaissance Italy. Against the vast output of texts written 
in Latin, the idea of philosophy as a subject of debate in the vernacular at a 
time when literacy rates were still so low has always appeared to be of marginal 
importance.2 As the language in which philosophical doctrines were generally 
disseminated, Latin was the necessary condition of any philosophical discus-
sion, while philosophy itself was mostly of interest only to university professors, 
intellectuals, and clerics for whom being conversant with the Latin language was 
a part of the profession. Very few intellectuals, let alone philosophers, produced 
vernacular writings in this period,3 and the first vernacular works of philoso-
phy, unsurprisingly, were devoted to themes that were of particular interest to 
Renaissance readers, namely rhetoric, politics, ethics, and economics.4 Equally 
unsurprising is the fact that the first philosophical texts in the vernacular were 
translations of classic works by Plato and Aristotle. Such translations reflected 
a strictly humanistic interest in Greek authors while providing a direct link to 
the two most important philosophical currents in Western culture alongside 
Christian thought.
Although the entire corpus of Plato’s works was rediscovered in the latter 
half of the Quattrocento, Plato was vulgarized less extensively than Aristotle, 
whose works offered a more systematic treatment of the full range of philo-
sophical disciplines. Interest in the Stagirite began to revive between the end of 
the twelfth and the start of the thirteenth centuries, and just as he came to be 
known as the Philosopher, his philosophy came to be known as the Philosophy. 
2. For literacy statistics in the Cinquecento, but only in reference to Venice, see Paul Grendler, Schooling 
in Renaissance Italy: Literacy and Learning, 1300–1600 (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1991), 42–47. 
3. On humanism as a period of unrest in the production of vernacular writings, see Mirko Tavoni, 
Storia della lingua italiana. Il Quattrocento (Bologna: il Mulino, 1992), 65. See also Letizia Panizza, 
“The Quattrocento,” in The Cambridge History of Italian Literature, ed. Peter Brand and Lino Pertile 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 152–54. On vernacular philosophy in the fifteenth 
century, see James Hankins, “Humanism in the Vernacular: The Case of Leonardo Bruni,” in Humanism 
and Creativity in the Renaissance: Essays in Honor of Ronald G. Witt, ed. Christopher S. Celenza and 
Kenneth Gouwens (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 11–31.
4. On this point, see Luca Bianchi, “Per una storia dell’aristotelismo volgare nel Rinascimento: problemi 
e prospettive di ricerca,” Bruniana & Campanelliana 15 (2009): 367–85.
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But humanism, with its emphasis on the philological reconstruction of Aristotle 
and his commentators, made the vulgarization of the Philosopher’s works a 
laborious process in which his original Greek words had to be recovered before 
any reconstruction of his thought could begin.
The so-called “vernacular Aristotle” began to gain currency in the 1540s, 
just as the vernacular was establishing itself as a language of culture and the 
Counter-Reformation was getting underway.5 The setting for this new phe-
nomenon was far removed from the traditional Aristotelian strongholds of the 
universities and the monasteries: namely, the academies and courts, but also 
workshops and printing houses; places, in other words, beyond the walls of 
the universities, where philosophy was still taught in Latin. With over three 
hundred printed and manuscript works, the statistics are indeed impressive. 
Yet, even so, the vulgarization of Aristotle in the Italian Renaissance has never 
received the attention it deserves from the experts.
It is only recently, thanks in particular to the tireless efforts of David Lines 
and Luca Bianchi, that light has begun to be shed on this area.6 Bianchi gives an 
accurate account of the underlying reasons for this neglect.7 First, populariza-
tion has always been seen as the primary purpose of vernacular writings, a view 
that has led to the assumption that vernacular writings are lacking in originality 
and theoretical depth. Second, historians have always overplayed the distinc-
tion between philosophers who were serious and committed professionals 
and those who were mere popularizers with scant doctrinal knowledge. The 
former generally wrote in Latin and deserved to be studied, whereas the latter 
were mere footnotes to the wider philosophical debate in the Renaissance. A 
third, related reason is that the only systematic study so far available on this 
topic, by Wiktor Wasik, is based on the false assumption that “vernacular” is 
5. It was also at this time that the Bible began to be widely vulgarized; see Gigliola Fragnito, La Bibbia al 
rogo. La censura ecclesiastica e i volgarizzamenti della Scrittura (1471–1605) (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1997), 
39.
6. For an exhaustive overview on studies on vernacular Aristotelianism, see David A. Lines, “Beyond 
Latin in Renaissance Philosophy: A Plea for New Critical Perspectives,” Intellectual History Review 4 
(2015), 1–17; David A. Lines, “Introduzione,” in “Aristotele fatto volgare”: Tradizione aristotelica e cultura 
volgare nel Rinascimento, ed. D. A. Lines and E. Refini (Pisa: ETS, 2015), 1–10. 
7. Bianchi lists these reasons in Bianchi, “Per una storia dell’aristotelismo volgare nel Rinascimento,” 
367–85.
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synonymous with “popular,”8 an assumption that has led research to focus more 
on the dissemination of the works rather than on their significance within the 
context in which they were produced. A fourth, eminently practical reason 
has been the lack of inventories of vernacular philosophical works from this 
period, a lack that the Warwick-based project led by David Lines and Simon 
Gilson has done much to redress, thereby making it possible at least to fill in 
some of the gaps in the research.9
Many questions remain open, however, one of which is the peculiar 
similarity between certain Reformation ideals and the views of intellectuals 
involved in translating Aristotle into the vernacular: at a time when the re-
formist movement wanted to open Christian doctrine up to the entire popula-
tion, also by means of vernacular renderings of biblical writings, intellectuals 
were resorting to vernacular renderings of Aristotle in order to disseminate 
Aristotelian doctrines among as wide a swathe of the population as possible. In 
both cases, opening up access to knowledge was seen as the most direct means 
of individual emancipation from authority and cultural renewal.
It is not my intention here to examine Protestant ideas concerning the 
adoption of the vernacular10 but rather to inquire into a common concept of 
vulgarizing certain aspects of knowledge that some intellectuals in Italy shared 
with reformist movements during a religious crisis that deeply affected six-
teenth-century Italian culture. For the purposes of my investigation, and in 
order to show that the connection between Aristotle’s vulgarizers and reformist 
movements is not merely whimsical but is based on solid grounds, I wish to 
8. Wiktor Wasik, “L’aristotélisme populaire comme fragment de la Renaissance,” Revue d’Histoire de la 
Philosophie et d’Histoire Générale de la Civilisation 9 (1935): 33–66.
9. The project was titled Vernacular Aristotelianism in Renaissance Italy, c. 1400–c. 1650. More details 
can be found on the website: http://warwick.ac.uk/vernaculararistotelianismproject. Jill Kraye, Luca 
Bianchi, Eugenio Refini, and Grace Allen also contributed to this project.
10. It is important also to mention here certain notions advanced by Martin Luther in his letter On 
Translating for their striking resemblance to some of the ideas upheld by Aristotle’s vulgarizers, 
especially where he asserts that in order to be understood by the people we must write and speak not in 
Latin or Greek but in the language of the housewives, the children, and the common people: “We do not 
have to ask the literal Latin how we are to speak German, as these donkeys do. Rather we must ask the 
mother in the home, the children on the street, the common man in the marketplace. We must be guided 
by their language, by the way they speak, and do our translating accordingly. Then they will understand 
it and recognize that we are speaking German to them.” Martin Luther, Werke, vol. 2 (Weimar: Böhlaus, 
1909), 640.
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focus on (1) the identity of the recipients of Aristotle’s vulgarizations, (2) the 
meaning of the process of vulgarization, and (3) the conception of knowledge 
that such writings brought into the culture of the Cinquecento. This will al-
low us to see that (1) vernacular renderings of Aristotle’s works were aimed at 
what we shall call the “people,” (2) vulgarization was not just a simple matter of 
disseminating, simplifying, and trivializing knowledge, and (3) vulgarization 
upheld the notion of the openness of knowledge. Each of these themes will be 
treated in a separate paragraph.11
2. The people
Before going on to explain what is meant by the people being the recipients 
of Aristotelian vulgarizations, it is worthwhile first to introduce the distinction 
suggested by Natalie Zemon Davis between “audience” and “public”; in other 
words, between the number of actual readers founded on the basis of library 
catalogues and other objective sources, and the target readership imagined by 
the authors when writing their books.12 It is a useful distinction to make, because 
we can interpret the phenomenon of Aristotelian vulgarizations differently ac-
cording to whether we are looking at the public or the audience.
In “Volgarizzare Aristotele: per chi?” Luca Bianchi asks the crucial ques-
tion of who the “real” recipients of Aristotelian vulgarizations in the Italian 
Renaissance were, therefore focusing primarily on their audience. He concludes 
that programmatic statements contained in prefaces and dedicatory letters 
are not reliable indicators, as such statements must be read in the context of 
the editorial considerations that went into the making of the texts. The physi-
ognomy of the recipients is determined not only by the language that is used 
11. It seems fitting, here, to comment on my own treatment of the texts. For citations from works 
published between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries I follow the numbering used by the authors 
themselves. My general rule has been to preserve original spelling and punctuation except where the 
best editions happen to be in modernized form; in the former, I have introduced minor changes as 
the sentence requires. When transcribing Italian vernacular, I have expanded all contractions, while 
dropping diphthongs and omitting diacritical marks. When quoting I very occasionally add punctuation 
to make clearer what I take to be the sense of difficult passages. For citations from secondary sources, I 
have used the latest editions in their original languages.
12. Natalie Zemon Davis, Society and Culture in Early Modern France: Eight Essays (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1975), 192–93.
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but also by the body of background knowledge that is assumed and the range 
of competences that are deemed to be transmissible.13 Vernacular texts, as 
Bianchi has correctly pointed out, can contain references to ancient authors or 
commentators, complex doctrines, sometimes also long citations in Greek and 
Latin, or philological disquisitions on the authenticity of the sources involv-
ing textual and paratextual skills normally associated with restricted groups of 
people,14 suggesting a socially elevated or even aristocratic audience15 capable 
of “handling matters of exegesis and philosophy of considerable difficulty.”16
My approach, on the other hand, is to look at the question of who philo-
sophical and scientific writings in the Cinquecento were vulgarized for from 
the point of view of the public rather than the audience. The intended “public” 
of certain works is the key element in intellectual history because it reveals the 
intentions and aims of intellectuals at a given time. The audience can testify 
only to the effectiveness of the attempted vulgarization, a matter that is beyond 
the purview of the author. The fact that a work does not always measure up 
to the intentions and needs of vulgarization may be determined by a range of 
factors such as the complexity of the topic, the absence of a specific language, 
or the author’s inability to fulfil his own purposes. A vulgarizer may set out to 
write the easiest and most accessible book possible and fail in any number of 
ways. The vulgarizers themselves were well aware of the difficulties they faced, 
as evidenced, for instance, by Ludovico Castelvetro, a key figure in the reformist 
movement in the Italian Cinquecento.17 In his Poetica d’Aristotile vulgarizzata 
et sposta, rightly selected by Bianchi as an example of an erudite vernacular 
text requiring knowledge of classical languages and literature,18 Castelvetro is 
aware of having vulgarized “perhaps with greater ardour of spirit than felicity 
13. Luca Bianchi, “Volgarizzare Aristotele: per chi?,” Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 
59 (2012), 494.
14. Bianchi, “Volgarizzare Aristotele,” 493.
15. Bianchi, “Volgarizzare Aristotele,” 486.
16. Bianchi, “Volgarizzare Aristotele,” 493.
17. On Castelvetro’s heterodoxy, see his essays in Lodovico Castelvetro. Filologia e ascesi, ed. Roberto 
Gigliucci (Rome: Bulzoni, 2007) and in Ludovico Castelvetro: letterati e grammatici nella crisi religiosa 
del Cinquecento, ed. Massimo Firpo and Guido Mongini (Florence: Olschki, 2008).
18. Bianchi, “Volgarizzare Aristotele,” 493. As we shall see later in the paragraph, Castelvetro wrote not 
for the common people but for poets and literary critics who had at least some grounding in Greek and 
Latin literature.
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of result.”19 In a rare moment of modesty, Castelvetro acknowledges that despite 
being moved by a genuine desire to vulgarize and clarify as much as possible 
the content of Aristotle’s poetics, the outcome is not what he had hoped for. 
Another notable case is Alessandro Piccolomini’s In mechanicas quaestiones 
Aristotelis paraphrasis paulo quidem plenior (1547), vulgarized in 1582 by 
Oreste Vannocci Biringucci with the title Parafrasi di Monsignor Alessandro 
Piccolomini […] sopra le Mechaniche d’Aristotele. Biringucci maintained that in 
order to “satisfy his just and ardent desire to benefit all, without prejudice of any 
kind, easily and happily, he [Piccolomini] set about adorning our language with 
every kind of science,” and above all
regretted having written in Latin, alongside certain other fine works, 
during his best years, and among his studies also this paraphrase of the 
Mechaniche d’Aristotele, because he saw that since it was in Latin it was 
not accessible to those who could have made the best use of it [that is] 
engineers and architects.20
According to Biringucci, therefore, Piccolomini believes it was a mistake to 
write in Latin rather than the vernacular, because the intended recipients who 
should have made use of the text were unable to read it. It is a significant ob-
servation because it shows how intellectuals sometimes fell short of their stated 
intentions despite their democratizing zeal: it was most likely not infrequent for 
the intended public of Latin or vernacular texts with complex commentaries to 
be much wider than the public they actually reached.
The failure of a single project, however, does not detract from the in-
tentions such works conveyed  — intentions that played a significant role in 
shaping the mindset of the time. This is why I believe it is important to focus 
also on direct evidence and the voice of the authors.21
The sources are divided here by discipline, and each group brings togeth-
er authors from different periods using different linguistic registers:
19. Ludovico Castelvetro, Poetica d’Aristotele volgarizzata et sposta (Wien: Stainhofer, 1570), Aiii.
20. Alessandro Piccolomini, Sopra le Mechaniche d’Aristotele (Rome: Zanetti, 1582), 5.
21. On the reliability of the prefaces, see Paolo Trovato, L’ordine dei tipografi. Lettori, stampatori, 
correttori tra Quattro e Cinquecento (Rome: Bulzoni, 1998), 143–61.
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a. Politics and ethics
[…] having laboured […] to reduce to the form of paraphrase all eight 
books of the Politics […] adding particular commentary to each book, as 
well as various annotations and pertinent questions to help in the overall 
understanding of the text, which it has been greatly pleasing to bring to 
this point, as it has allowed me to see clearly how great a benefit the civil 
discourses written by Aristotle are to men, who are operating manuals 
of government, for setting them up, ordering them, and maintaining 
them.22
Since no small benefit is derived by men from the knowledge of 
government and the running of cities, in these past days from Greek 
sources I have drawn Italic streams, the eight books of the Republic, which 
they call Politics.23
But since the doctrine of Aristotle is wrapped in considerations of such 
depth that a great deal of study and attentive research is required of any 
who wish to master it, it has been my intention to ease the way of this 
science, reducing it so to speak to the substance, and explaining it clearly 
and succinctly, so that thus exposed to greater ease of understanding it 
shall reveal of its own the errors that have entered into the art of politics 
from the world […] having left aside the digressions, the responses and the 
lengthy disputations […] I have captured the sentiment of Aristotele […] 
so that, if I am not mistaken, in brevity no greater clarity could be wished 
for, nor could such breadth of material be reduced to greater brevity. 
22. Antonio Scaino, La politica di Aristotele ridotta in modo di Parafrasi (Rome: Case del Popolo Romano, 
1578), preface: “[…] havend’io, conforme alla fatica dell’Ethica, ridotto sotto forma di Parafrasi tutti gli 
otto libri della politica […] con particolari argomenti sopra ciascun libro, et con l’aggionta insieme 
di varie annotazioni, et dubbi molto opportuni, da me posti insieme per maggiore intelligenza di 
tutta l’opra: la quale mi sono ancho compiaciuto pur assai d’haver condotta a questo fine, per havere 
manifestamente conosciuto, quanto grande utile possino arrecare a gli huomini, che sono manuali 
operatori de governi, et per instituirgli, & per assettargli, & per conservargli, questi civili discorsi 
composti da Aristotele.”
23. Antonio Brucioli, Gli otto libri della republica (Venice: Brucioli, 1547), dedication: “Perché non 
piccola utilità aporta a gli huomini la cognitione de governi, & reggimenti delle città, a questi passati 
giorni, da fonti greci tirai a rivi italici, gli otto libri della Republica, che chiamano Politica.”
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And in so doing I believe I have made a useful and worthy contribution 
to Princes & men of republic & court, for whom it shall serve as a 
reminder of civil discipline, seeing as they are distracted by their work and 
responsibilities and cannot normally attend to such studies […].24
[…] having recently received the works of the singular Philosopher 
Aristotle, the Secret of secrets, and the Ethics, of pleasing and useful 
subjects to all kinds of men; and considering how much benefit they bring 
to all, I dedicated myself for the common good to translating them into a 
plain and common language.25
Having witnessed […] since my early years many Princes & other noble 
individuals pass almost indifferently through life without letters and 
without any adornment of praiseworthy customs, and feeling troubled 
by this, I always had this thought that if they had devoted themselves to 
reading and understanding what Aristotle left us in his books on Ethics, 
the love of good virtues would easily have been ignited in their souls, 
as well as the desire to acquire them. Thinking then that the manner of 
expression of that philosopher is not suitable for idiot men, and therefore 
24. Panfilo Persico, Della filosofia morale & politica d’Aristotele (Venice: Ciotti, 1617), b3: “Ma perché la 
dottrina d’Aristotele è involta in considerazioni così profonde, che grande studio, & attenzione ricerca, 
da chi se ne voglia render capace, perciò è stato mio consiglio d’agevolar la via a questa scienza, con 
ridurla quasi in sostanza, e spiegarla con chiarezza & brevità, accioch’esposta a più facil cognitione faccia 
per se stessa più chiari gli errori, che sono seguiti dal mondo nell’arte politica […] lasciate le digressioni, 
le repliche, & le disputationi prolisse […] ho raccolto il sentimento d’Aristotele […] in modo che, se 
non m’inganno, nella brevità non si possa desiderar più chiarezza, ne l’ampiezza di materie cos’ gravi 
ristrigner in maggior brevità. In che ho stimato di far opra grata, & profittevole à Principi, & huomini 
di republica, & di corte, a quali potrà servir per memoriale della disciplina civile, poiché distratti nelle 
occupationi, & uffici della vita non possono applicarsi ordinatamente a questi studi […].”
25. Giovanni Manenti, Col nome de Dio, Il segreto de Segreti, le Moralità, & la Phisionomia d’Aristotele 
(Venice: Tacuino, 1538), Aiiv: “[…] essendomi ultimamente pervenuto à le mani de l’opere del singolar 
Philosopho Aristotile, Il segreto de segreti, & le moralità, di soggetto dilettivoli, & utilissimo a ogni sorte 
d’huomini; & considerando il giovamento che possi esser ad ognuno, mi son messo per utilità comune 
a traslatarle in lengua plana e volgare.”
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that it would be necessary to make it easier in our language so that every 
person, however simple, could receive its message.26
[…] it so happens that this eminent and great philosopher [Aristotle], 
being overly subtle in his treatment of the sciences, is for this reason 
so obscure to many as not to be fully understood. […] Hence wishing 
greatly, while His Holiness [Pope Julius III] is intent on correcting the 
world and leading it on the right path of religion, that likewise Aristotle 
should lead us on the path of good conduct more easily than in the past, 
I have endeavoured with all my strength to make his teaching clear in a 
new way, so that in this century of ours every one of us can find the right 
path each in his own way. And I thought that it should be done first by 
transposing his science into a more common and accessible language, 
which Greek and Latin are not, and then ironing out the many difficulties 
he artificiously filled his writings with.27
I am inspired to act for the benefit of the world (because we are all born 
to give benefit) […] Having therefore diligently inquired, and finally 
seen that the things Aristotle writes in all his books are by their nature 
even very straightforward, but are made to seem obscure because of the 
26. Galeazzo Florimonte, Sopra l’Ethica d’Aristotile (Venice: Nicolini, 1567), dedication: “Veggendo io 
[…] infin dalla mia gioventù molti Principi, & altre persone nobili, quasi indifferentemente menarne 
senza lettere la vita loro, & senza ornamento alcuno di lodevoli costumi, & di ciò dolendomi insieme; 
hebbi sempre questo pensiero, che quando essi si fossero dilettati di leggere, & d’intendere quello, che 
ci lasciò scritto Aristotile ne suoi libri dell’Ethica, si sarebbe potuto agevolmente destare ne gli animi 
loro l’amore delle belle virtù, & il desiderio dell’acquistarle. Considerando poi, che la maniera del parlare 
di quel filosofo non è atta ad essere intesa da gli huomini idioti, & che perciò sarebbe stato bisogno 
spianarlo talmente nella lingua nostra, che ogni persona, per semplice che fosse, n’havesse potuto haver 
notitia.”
27. Felice Figliucci, Della filosofia morale libri dieci (Rome: Valgrisi, 1551), dedication: “[…] questo 
dignissimo, e gran filosofo [Aristotele], nel trattare troppo sottilmente le scienze è tanto in tal guisa 
oscuro che da molti per avventura non è pienamente inteso […] Per tanto desiderando io sommamente, 
che mentre che la Santità V. [Papa Giulio III] è tutta intenta a correggere il mondo, & indirizzarlo ne 
la vera strade de la religione, parimente Aristotile con più facil modo che per l’addietro non ha fatto, 
a l’acquisto de buon costumi ci guidasse, ho cercato con ogni mio sforzo, in nuova maniera renderlo 
chiaro, acciocché in questo nostro seculo ciascuno per diverse vie si indirizzasse al ben fare. E mi avvisai 
dovermi venir fatto, prima trasportando la sua scienza in una lingua più comune, & agevole che la greca, 
o la latina non è, di poi sciogliendo molte difficultà, de le quali egli ad arte volse esser ripieno.”
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difficulty and succinctness of their treatment, I have endeavoured to make 
them as clear as it was possible for me to do so […] rendering them in this 
language of ours, and expanding considerably where he was constricted, 
and brief […] for the same reason I have avoided raising the style too high 
[…] but have tried instead to use middling, appropriate, and clear words 
that are accessible to someone whose only interest is to teach and is far 
removed from ostentation and superfluity of words.28
I sought to devote a few hours of the night […] after a brief rest, to the study 
of moral philosophy, a fitting study, & and one that is perhaps necessary 
for anyone who governs people & cities, as you justly & piously do. […] 
And this is a brief introduction to the Ethics of Aristotle, already attempted 
a while ago in a scholarly and useful manner by Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples 
[…] it seemed to me not inappropriate to translate the introduction also 
of this work into the vernacular […] Nor will I dwell too long on revealing 
to you and showing you the usefulness of this introduction […] I will 
say only that reading this work alone, and observing it, every man can 
become an excellent & perfect moral philosopher.29
With this translation […] I will give considerable benefit to those who 
do not know all those languages which have conveyed to us so many 
28. Figliucci, letter to the readers: “[…] io ho in animo di fare in giovamento del mondo (perché tutti 
a giovare siamo nati) […] Havendo io adunque diligentemente considerato, e veduto finalmente che 
le cose che scrive Aristotile in tutti li suoi libri, per natura loro sono facili pur assai e che solo paiono 
oscure per la difficultà e brevità con la quale egli ha trattate; mi sono sforzato di renderle chiare quanto 
per me s’è potuto […] mettendole in questa nostra lingua, et allargandomi assai, dove egli è stato stretto, 
e breve […] per la medesima cagione non ho cercato di inalzarmi con lo stile troppo altamente […] ma 
ho voluto usar parole mediocri, propie, e chiare, convenienti ad uno che solo desidera insegnare e che 
sia lontano da ogni vano ornamento e superfluità di parole.”
29. Giulio Landi, Le attioni morali (Venice: Giolito, 1584), 1–2, 12: “[…] io mi sforzai di porre qualc’hora 
della notte […] dopo un breve sonno, nello studio della Filosofia morale, studio invero convenevole, & 
forse anco necessario a chiunque governa popoli, & cittadi, si come voi giustamente & santamente 
fate. […] E ciò sia una breve introduttione nell’Ethica d’Aristotele, già buon tempo fa da Iacopo Fabro 
dottamente, & utilmente composta […] parvemi non essere disconvenevole l’introduttione anco d’essa 
rendere volgare […] Ne mi estenderò molto in aprirvi, & mostrarvi l’utilità di questa introduttione 
[…] Dirovvi solamente, che questa sola opera leggendo, & osservando, può ciascuno huomo divenire 
eccellente & perfetto filosofo morale.”
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noble sciences; ignorance of which deprives them of the knowledge of 
such beneficial things.30
But since this custom of giving Baptism gifts is not the same throughout 
Italy […] according to the customs of our City of Siena it falls to me to 
give your child a gift, I debated in my mind for a long time what worthy 
Gem I could present to him. And as everything seemed unworthy to 
me, I finally decided that I could present to him no joy of greater worth 
than an institution for his entire life, such as could be drawn from the 
depths of Aristotle and Plato: so that he would find himself guided from 
the cradle through all the stages of his life according to the moral code, 
finally reaching the utmost happiness that is appropriate to man as man. 
Nor was I discouraged from my purpose by the thought that it might be 
a superfluous task, since he has you as his mother to instruct him very 
satisfactorily: no small benefit, it seemed to me, would he derive, as your 
knowledge demonstrates, from his becoming acquainted with these great 
philosophers. 31
b. Rhetoric and poetics
Last year, most illustrious Prince [Cosimo De’ Medici], having set myself 
to doing something that would please Your Excellency and at the same 
time would prove beneficial if not to all men, then at least the majority 
30. Giulio Ballino, La morale filosofia (Venice: Valvassori, 1564), 10: “Con questa tradottione […] 
gioverò appresso non poco a coloro, i quali non intendono tutte quelle lingue che nodrite ci hanno 
tante nobili scienze; la quale ignoranza li priva della cognition di così salutevoli cose.”
31. Alessandro Piccolomini, De la institutione di tutta la vita de l’homo (Venice: Scoto, 1545), 5r: “Ma 
perché questa usanza dei doni del Battesimo in ogni luogho d’Italia non è conforme […] secondo lusanza 
de la Città nostra di Siena: a me tocca di qualche presente il figlio vostro adornare più tempo rivolsi ne 
la mente fra me medesimo, qual degna Gemma donar gli potesse. Et ogni cosa indegna parendomi, mi 
risolvei finalmente, che più ricca gioia, ritrovar per lui non potevo, che un’institutione di tutta la vita 
sua, laqual si tresse da le viscere d’Aristotele e di Platone: ond’egli fin da le fascie di età in età prendendo 
norma al vivere suo, finalmente a la somma felicità, che a l’hom si conviene come homo, condotto si 
ritrovasse. Ne a quest’impresa mi sbigottiva il pensar che fusse superfluo di questo fare, havend’egli per 
madre voi che bastantissimamente instituir lo potrete: però che non poco giovamento consideravo io, 
che dovesse essergli che quello istesso, che ne l’esempio di voi sia per cognoscere, vegha conforme al 
giudicio di si gran Filosofi.”
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of them, as far as it was in power to do so, I decided to render in our 
Florentine language the Rhetoric of the great Aristotle […] A translation, 
most illustrious Prince, which may serve those who, not reading Greek 
and who do not disdain to read in the vernacular, will not be concerned 
with knowing in exquisite detail all that is required to understand this 
Art, but will be content to know the subject-matter in an approximate 
manner.32
[…] without wishing to ignore the words of others, especially those that 
appeared to me not to have been uttered inappropriately [by others], 
and without stinting on the authority of other writers in order to convey 
the meaning of the histories and the fables, and the other obscure things 
written by Aristotle, I did what I deemed necessary, perhaps with greater 
ardour of spirit than felicity of result, to represent the poetic art not only 
by showing and opening up that which has been written in these few pages 
by that supreme philosopher, but also what should or could have been 
written for the benefit of those who desire to know how properly to 
compose poems and rightly to judge whether their compositions have 
the right attributes or not.33
32. Bernardo Segni, Rettorica et poetica d’Aristotile (Venice: Imperatore, 1551), 2r, 4r: “Havendomi 
Principe Illustrissimo [Cosimo De’ Medici] nell’anno passato posto dinanzi agli occhi per oggetto di 
far qualche cosa, che piacesse a V. Ecc. et insieme che fusse per giovare se non a tutti, almeno a quella 
più parte degli huomini, che per me si potesse: mi venne in animo di mettere in questa nostra lingua 
Fiorentina la Rettorica del grande Aristotile […] La qual’traduttione Principe Illustrissimo forse potrà 
servire a coloro, i quali non sappiendo la Greca lingua, & in questa non si disdegnando di leggere, 
non si cureranno di saper così squisitamente tutto ciò, che s’appartiene per intender questa Arte, ma che 
basterà loro di conoscer questa materia alquanto più grossolanamente.”
33. Castelvetro, Poetica d’Aristotele volgarizzata et sposta, Aiii: “[…] io senza tralasciare punto la 
dichiarazione delle parole, & specialmente di quelle che non mi sono parute essere state sconvenevolmente 
dagli altri dichiarate, & senza risparmiare l’autorità degli altri scrittori per fare intendere l’historie & le 
favole, & l’altre cose oscure scritte da Aristotele quanto ho giudicato far bisogno ho tentato, & forse con 
più ardore d’animo che con felicità d’effetto, di far manifesta l’arte poetica non solamente mostrando & 
aprendo quello che è stato lasciato scritto in queste poche carte da quel sommo philosopho, ma quello 
anchora che doveva o poteva essere scritto per utilità piena di coloro che volessero sapere come si 
debba fare a comporre bene poemi, & a giudicare dirittamente se i composti habbiano quello che 
deono havere o no.”
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c. Logic
[…] for the sole desire of benefitting the many that I know who have 
excellent minds, well suited to doing philosophy, and not knowing any 
other language than their mother tongue, Italian, so as not to waste 
what is left to them of their good years in foreign languages, so wrapped 
in ignorance are they, that I decided some years ago to treat matters of 
philosophy, not only in an orderly and accessible manner, but also in our 
pure Italian language.34
Women likewise, in the virtue in which Aristotle maintains that the happy 
state of the city resides, it not being the custom in Italy to make them 
learn any language other than what they learn from their wet-nurses, 
thus remain deprived and stripped through no fault of their own of those 
habits which could make them happy: nor can they through reading learn 
how powerful are the virtues which serve them so well, nor through which 
operations, exercises, and offices they can perfect themselves, every good 
news being closed in the womb of Philosophy.35
Since […] the doctrine of Aristotle (not to mention his other parts) is a 
mirror and a law of civil living, and likewise order and government of 
affairs of state, I deemed it to be extremely useful to see it in our vernacular 
34. Alessandro Piccolomini, L’instrumento della filosofia (Rome: Valgrisi, 1551), aiir–v: “per solo 
desiderio di giovare a molti che io conosco d’intelletto buonissimo, et atto a filosofare, i quali non 
sapendo altra lingua che la italiana lor materna, per non cusmare intor lingue stranie, quel che gli avanza 
de i buoni anni loro, involti si vivano ne l’ignorantia, mi lasciai cader’ in animo alquanti anni sono di 
trattare scrivendo le cose di Filosofia, non solo con ordine pieno d’agevolezza […] ma con lingua pura 
Italiana nostra.”
35. Alessandro Piccolomini, L’instrumento della filosofia (Rome: Valgrisi, 1551), aiiiiv: “Le donne 
parimente, ne la virtù de le quali vuole Aristotele che il mezo del felice stato de le città risegga, non 
essendo costume in Italia di far loro apprender’ altra lingua, che quella che dà le nutrici imparano; restan 
per questo prive, et ignude senza lor colpa di quelli habiti, che far le potrien felici: né possan leggendo 
imparare di quanta forza sieno le virtù che lor convengano, et con quali operazioni, esercitazioni, et 
offitij si possin perfette rendere: essendo ogni buona notitia nel ventre chiusa de la Filosofia.”
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language as well as reduced to a practical brevity, so that it could be 
accessible and understood by everyone.36
d. Psychology
[…] all men of letters that are good by nature, because they seek to 
communicate the gifts that God granted them, will comfort each person 
in such a way that a person will seek the condition and the strength to 
become virtuous; and if they see a woodsman, they will inspire him at least 
to turn to mathematics, if not other things […] and so they will encourage 
an apothecary to take up medicine: and ultimately each person to try to 
learn the things they think will be useful and honourable in some way.37
And it is my purpose to write this work in our vernacular, so that those 
who are by nature gifted with excellent discourse and fine intellect, but 
know neither Latin nor Greek, may understand this science, which until 
now we might say has been buried to them.38
36. Ludovico Dolce, Somma della filosofia d’Aristotele, e prima della dialettica (Venice: Sessa, 1565), *2: 
“Essendo, […] la dottrina di Aristotele (per tacer le altre sue parti) specchio e regola del viver Civile, 
e parimente ordine e governo de le cose pubbliche, ho giudicato sempre cosa di grandissimo profitto, 
che ella si potesse vedere nella nostra volgar lingua, e ridotta in una convenevole brevità, accio che la 
medesima fosse agevole ad essere appresa da tutti.”
37. Giovan Battista Gelli, Opere (Torino: UTET, 1976), 175–76: “[…] tutti i letterati che sono di natura 
buoni, cercando di communicare, quei beni che ha dato loro Iddio, conforteranno ciascuno in quel 
modo che ricercherà lo stato e ’l potere di colui, a darsi a le virtù; e se vedranno un legnaiolo, lo 
inanimiranno almanco a le cose di matematica, se non ad altro […] e così conforteranno uno speziale a 
studiare medicina: e ciascheduno finalmente a cercare di imparare quelle cose che penseranno dovergli 
essere in qualche parte utili e onorevoli.”
38. Francesco Venier, I discorsi sopra i tre libri dell’anima d’Aristotele (Venice: Arrivabene, 1555), 1v: “Et 
questa opera io intendo di scrivere in lingua nostra volgare; acciò che quelli, che sono dotati dalla Natura 
di ottimo discorso, & d’acutissimo intelletto, & non posseggono né la lingua Latina, né la Greca, 
possano intendere questa scienza, che in fino a qui a loro si può dir che sia stata sepolta.”
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Men of prudence and judiciousness must endeavour to make idiot and 
vulgar men as little so as possible, and there is no other way to do this 
than to teach them first the virtues, then science.39
[…] we have sought to make our presentation brief, and in our sweet and 
graceful vulgar language, so that those who understand a bit of Latin, 
or even thought they know it, they are unable due to the lack of time to 
reread such a plethora of obscure and confused argumentations, may 
at least have this little work of ours, and in enjoyment reading it, may 
thereby easily satisfy their desires.40
[…] this subject-matter is the most elevated and deepest that may be 
treated within the confines of natural sciences. And so far it may be said not 
to have been understood by those who have set themselves to examining 
it, so diverse and obscure have their utterances been, but it has been made 
so clear that its secrets could not be more fully revealed […] moved to 
pity thinking of the benefit that the scholars of humanities could draw 
therefrom, I have gathered it together and undertaken to publish it.41
39. Benedetto Varchi, Opere, Vol. 2 (Trieste: Llyod, 1859), 490: “ciascuno prudente uomo e giudizio 
debbe ingegnarsi con tutto il poter suo che gli idioti e volgari uomini siano meno che si possa, e ciò 
altramente non può farsi che con l’insegnare loro prima le virtù, poscia le scienze.”
40. Angelico Buonriccio, Paraphrasi sopra i tre libri dell’anima d’Aristotile (Venice: Arrivabene, 1558), 
letter to the reader: “[…] questa nostra spositione l’habbiamo voluta fare brieve, & nella nostra 
dolce & leggiadra lingua vulgare, acciocché quelli, i quali sono poco intendenti delle latine lettere, 
overo se bene sono, non possono per la brevità del tempo rileggere una tanta moltitudine d’oscure & 
confuse spositioni, habbiano almeno questa nostra operetta, la quale con diletto trascorrendo, possano 
agevolmente sodisfare a’ loro desiderij.”
41. Benedetto Dottori, Trattato de sogni secondo l’opinione d’Aristotele (Padova: Pasquati, 1575), 
dedication written by Antonino Compagna: “[…] questa materia è la più alta, & più profonda che 
trattarsi possa entro i termini della scientia naturale. Et si può dire che fin’horan non sia stata intesa, 
così diversamente, & oscuramente n’han parlato coloro, che s’han proposto d’essaminarla, hora però è 
talmente fatta chiara, che cotai secreti non si poteano più manifestamente palesare […] io mosso a pietà 
considerando quanto beneficio ne possano prendere i studiosi delle belle lettere, l’ho raccolta, & mi 
son messo a pubblicarla.”
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e. Physics, astronomy, and meteorology
It seemed to many ancient philosophers that to publish the sciences and 
make them clear to everyone was to throw away roses and pearls, and 
so they concealed what they knew with hieroglyphs, mysteries, fables, 
symbols, and enigmas, almost more than nature herself. And in so doing 
they showed themselves to be jealous of power and ungrateful, and unlike 
the giver of these and other graces. Even so there are some (albeit very few) 
who seek to defend them, saying that in this way the sciences maintained 
their reputation and dignity, because they were accessible only to fine 
minds and to the wealthy and important people. […] And they say that 
by popularizing them and publishing them, good minds are put on a par 
with uncouth minds, and those who are notable and important with 
those who are low-caste and plebeian. Nor do they refrain from attacking 
those who have sought to defeat ignorance in the world and spread the 
sciences in all the languages.42
On the sphere of the world four books in the Tuscan language […] 
reduced to such convenience and such an easy manner of demonstration 
that however little practice in the study of Mathematics will be sufficient 
to easily and quickly understand everything.43
Even here it has come to my attention (most noble and beautiful Madonna 
Laudomia) that having Your Ladyship found herself this past spring one 
42. Piccolomini, Sopra le Mechaniche d’Aristotele, 4: “Parve à molti antichi filosofi, che il publicar le 
scienze, e farle chiare à tutti, fusse un gettar via le rose, e le perle, e perciò oscurono le cose conosciute 
da loro con hieroglifi, misterij, favole, simboli, & enigmi, quasi più, che non fa l’istessa natura. Nel che 
si dimostronno invidiosi de poteri, & ingrati, e dissimili al donator di quelle, e d’ogni gratia. Con tutto 
ciò si trovano alcuni (Se ben pochissimi) che cercan difenderli, con dire, che così facendo mantenevano 
le scienze nella reputazione e dignità loro, perché non eron capaci di quelle, se non i buoni ingegni, e le 
persone ricche, e principali. […] E dicono che nel facilitarle, e pubblicarle, vengono pareggiati i buoni 
con i rozzi intelletti, e le persone illustri, e principali con le vili, e plebei. Ne si astengono dal biasimar 
coloro, che han tentato di scacciar l’ignoranza del mondo, e diffondere in tutte le lingue le scienze.”
43. Alessandro Piccolomini, De la sfera del mondo (Venice: Del Pozzo, 1540), frontmatter: “De la 
sfera del mondo libri quattro in lingua toscana […] ridotti a tanta agevolezza, & a così facil modo di 
dimostrare che qual si voglia poco essercitato negli studij di Matematica potrà agevolissimamente & 
con prestezza intenderne il tutto.”
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day in the company of other most noble women in a garden […] beautiful 
and scholarly and philosophical arguments occurred between you […] 
I understood that Your Ladyship said that alongside the sorrow she has 
always felt, having been born a woman, not having had the opportunity 
to devote her years to some prestigious study and honourable science, 
and for this reason it pained her above all that she has not been able to 
nourish her soul with questions of Astrology, towards which she felt 
particularly drawn. […] Having thus heard of such a pleasing desire, […] 
I was inflamed with an equal desire to participate in such a great wish, 
as far as my strength would permit, by setting myself to bring together 
from the most famous and recognized authors who have written on 
matters astrological, everything that I considered most worthy of being 
known: because I have no doubt that however subtle and erudite the 
speculation, if it is not perfectly understood by Your Ladyship it is only 
because Your Ladyship has not been able to know certain things, which I 
believe to be because the Latin language was hidden from her, as a result 
of the malpractice of our times: which, since the sciences are not in our 
language, still prevents women from learning the language in which they 
are written: in this way it stops many women from entering into the study 
of the most excellent and rare letters […] this little work on the Sphere 
of the World […] having employed all my ability and diligence to reduce 
such things to such ease and clarity, that I am certain that anyone (man or 
woman), however little practice in the study of mathematics they have 
had, will be able to understand it very well […].44
44. Alessandro Piccolomini, De la sfera del mondo (Venice: Del Pozzo, 1540), dedication: “Mi è per 
insin qua venuto al’orecchie (Nobilissima e Bellissima Madonna Laudomia) che trovandosi in questa 
Primavera passata, la S.V. un giorno con altre nobilissime Donne in un giardino, […] bellissimi & molti 
dotti e filosofici ragionamenti accader tra voi […] intesi che la S.V. disse che oltra’l dispiacer ch’ella ha 
sempre havuto, che per esser nata Donna, non le sia stato conceduto di poter donare gli anni suoi, a 
qualche pregiato studio & honorata Scientia, per questo ciò le dolea più che per altro, ch’ella non havea 
possuto pascer l’animo suo, de le cose d’Astrologia a le quali la si sentia più che ad altro inclinata. […] 
Dunque un così bel suo desiderio, doppo che venutom’al’orechie […] m’accese parimente d’ardente desio 
di voler in parte a così honorata voglia, per quanto si stendon le forze mie sodisfare, con l’ingegnarmi di 
raccoglier in lingua nostra dai più famosi et approvati Scrittori, che han trattato dele cose d’Astrologia, 
tutto quel che io giudicasse più degno d’esser saputo: perciò ch’io non dubito che quanto si voglia sottile 
& dotta speculatione, non sia per esser da V.S. compresa benissimo, essendo che sola cagion che V.S. 
non habbia possuto alcune cose sapere, stimo io che sia l’esserle stato ascosa la lingua latina, colpa dela 
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Most gracious readers, who desire to read the writings of others, more 
out of a desire to learn than to criticize and malign; you have always been 
the only audience for my works […] I want to warn you of certain things. 
Firstly, you must know that in all the works I have written until now, 
my primary intention has been to write as clearly as possible: seeking in 
every study to present the subjects to other intellects in a manner so plain, 
so accessible and free of difficulty, that not only fine intellects but also 
average ones can learn them. […] I have always judged either envious 
or uncultured those who, the more the subjects they have set themselves 
to dealing with are wrapped in obscurity, the more instead of shedding 
light upon them, they seek, either with excessive brevity, or with words 
that are not well known, or with arrogant affected elegance, or, finally, by 
representing, while translating from one language to the other, things they 
do not understand, adding difficulties and hoping in this way to appear 
more scholarly. […] for this reason I have tried to make the subjects 
accessible with known vocabulary and familiar expressions, stating, 
replying and exemplifying to shed light upon them: so that for this reason 
many times I have chosen to adopt a lower style, and a turn of phrase 
that is perhaps too domestic; because it did not seem to me useful for the 
Readers to do the opposite and leave things obscure. […] even though 
these things that I deal with are written in our language, no one can claim 
that for this reason they can be read and understood with flowing ease, as 
if they were histories, or romances, because the difficulties of the sciences 
do not depend on the language, but are tied up with the subject itself, so 
that it is more the way in which they are written and expressed than the 
variety of language that will make them clear, hence I am writing them in 
our Tuscan language, because such a language will make them easier, but 
mal’usanza dei nostri tempi: la qual da poi che le scientie non son nela lingua nostra, ne vieta ancora 
che le Donne non apprendin quella lingua, in chui le si truovano: così ne impedisce che molte Donne 
non venghin negli studi dele lettere escellentissime e rare […] questa operetta dela Sfera del Mondo […] 
havendo usato ogni ingegno, e diligentia di ridur tai cose a tanta facilità e chiarezza, che io tengo per 
certo che qual si voglia poco esercitato negli Studij di Matematica (o Donna o huomo che sia) potrà 
intenderle agevolissimamente […].”
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only to release us, who are born in Italy, from the need to learn foreign 
languages before acquiring and discovering the sciences. 45
My intention, most noble and judicious Reader, is to treat all those natural 
effects which the Greek Philosophers were wont to call Meteorological 
[…] My reason for writing such things is that every type of person desires 
to know about them: those for whom it is more a matter of honour 
and enjoyment to know the causes of honourable things […] others for 
whom it is more useful […] greatly wish to learn this doctrine, such as 
the fathers of families, so that they may foresee the abundance and lack 
of fodder, wines, oils, and other similar things that are required for the 
home. […] The learned doctors make use of such noble and worthwhile 
knowledge not only for science but also in practical applications […] so 
that they may predict what types of disease might occur […] Those that 
travel by sea, whether to provision cities or to conduct naval warfare, 
these still make great use of such science, as it allows them to foresee 
45. Alessandro Piccolomini, La prima parte dele theoriche overo speculationi dei pianeti (Venice: Varisco, 
1558), letter to the readers: “Benignissimi Lettori, & desiderosi di leggere gli altrui scritti, più per desiderio 
di sapere, che per voglia di riprendere, & malignare; a voi soli ho io scritto sempre le opere mie […] 
voglio voi d’alcune cose avvertire. Primieramente voi havete da sapere che in tutte quelle opere che io ho 
scritte fin qui, ho havuto più che ad altro intentione a scrivere con quella maggior chiarezza, che è stato 
a me possibile: procurando con ogni studio di mettere innanzi agli altrui intelletti le materie così piane, 
così agevolate, & sciolte di difficultà, che non solo li sottili intelletti, ma li mediocri ancora le possino 
apprendere. […] ho io sempre giudicato, o invidiosi, o poco dotti coloro, li quali, quanto più li soggetti 
di cui han preso a trattare sono involti di oscurità, tanto più in cambio di dar lor luce, si ingegnano, 
o con troppa brevità, o con vocaboli poco noti, o con soverchia affettata elegantia, o finalmente con 
depingere, da una lingua transportando nel’altra, le cose che non intendano, aggiugnere difficultà, 
sperando forse per questo parer più dotti. […] per queta cagione ho cercato di aprire le materie, & con 
vocaboli manifesti, & modi di dire familiari, dichiarando, replicando, & esemplificando dar lor luce: in 
tanto che per questo molte volte ho più presto voluto descendere a uno stile piutosto basso che no, & a 
un modo di dire troppo forse domestico; che con fare il contrario lascar le cose più oscure, che al’util dei 
Lettori non mi è paruto di convenire. […] seben queste cose, che io tratto sono scritte in nostra lingua; 
non per questo ha da stimarsi alcuno che si possin leggendo intender con quella agevolezza scorrendo, 
che se fossero historie, o novelle, percioche le difficultà dele scientie non dependano dala lingua, ma 
son congiunte con le cose stesse, di maniera che più il modo di dirle, & di esprimerle, che le varietà dele 
lingue le posson far chiare, ne le scrivo io in questa lingua nostra Toscana, perché tal lingua le faccia più 
facili, ma solo per torre a noi che nasciamo in Italia la necessità di apprender le lingue esterne per poter 
acquistare & trovar le scientie […].”
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whether they will be facing contrary or favourable winds […] I shall give a 
brief treatment [of the natural effects] so that no one may be affronted by 
the length. […] And it pleases me to discourse on these things no less in 
this Tuscan, or rather Florentine, language of ours than in Latin, to both 
benefit and please each person.46
This is but a brief sample; however, these voices echoing from the past provide 
us with important clues as to what a likely public for Aristotle’s works could be. 
At least two levels of public may be discerned.
At a more general level, the recipient group includes the largest possible 
number of people, including “idiots,” “simple minds,” “ignorants,” and “illiter-
ates”; in other words, people who potentially lacked the culture to access higher 
knowledge.47 As so valuably suggested by Elizabeth Eisenstein, the majority of 
46. Francesco Verino, Trattato delle Methore (Florence: Marescotti, 1578), letter to the reader: 
“L’intentione mia è nobilissimo, & giudiziosissimo Lettore di trattare di tutti quelli effetti naturali, i quali 
da’ Filosofi greci comunemente son chiamati Metheorologici […] La cagione che mi muove a scrivere di 
cosifatte cose è, perché ogni sorte di persone desidera haverne qualche notizia: quelli ne’ quali può più 
l’honore, & il diletto di cose honorate hanno gran voglia di saperne la causa […] gli altri ne quali può 
più l’utile […] son molto disiderosi di apparare questa dottrina, come i padri di famiglia, perciocché 
con questa antiveggono l’abbondanza, & carestia de’ grandi, biade, vini, olii, & di simili altre cose 
necessarie alla casa. […] I Medici dotti non meno per scienza, che per molta pratica approvati ancor 
essi vagliono di così gentile & utile cognizione […] così preveggono che sorte di inferimità possono 
avvenire […] Quelli che vanno per mare, o sia per provedere di Mercanzie le città, osia per conto di 
condurre gente per guerra Marittima ancor questi fanno un gran conto di così fatta scienza, potendo 
per essa prevedere se hanno a tirare venti contrarii, o pure prosperi […] Io con brevità ne discorrerò 
[degli effetti naturali] acciocché nessuno dalla lunghezza [sia] infastidito. […] Emmi piaciuto parlare 
di queste cose, non meno in questa nostra lingua Toscana, o per dir meglio Fiorentina, che io mi faccia 
ancora nella latina, per giovare, & dilettare insieme ognuno […].”
47. In this paper I will adopt expressions such as “idiots,” “simple minds,” and “vulgars,” which at that 
time did not necessarily imply a derogatory attitude, as they do in current English. See Gigliola Fragnito, 
Proibito capire. La Chiesa e il volgare nella prima età moderna (Bologna: il Mulino, 2005), 272. Similarly, 
“illiterates” were for the most part those who were not capable of reading, writing, and speaking 
Latin, hence in modern terms they may well have been literate. See Herbert Grundmann, “Litteratus-
illiteratus: Der Wandel einer Bildungsnorm vom Altertum zum Mittelalter,” Archiv fur Kulturgeschichte 
40 (1958), 1–65. Translations of idioti, volgari, semplici, ignoranti, etc., have been kept literal because it 
would be impossible to render the wide spectrum of terms with a couple of neutral words. On the use 
of these expressions in the Italian language, see Marina Roggero, Insegnar lettere. Richerche di storia 
dell’istruzione in età moderna (Alessandria: Edizioni dell’Orso, 1992); Marina Roggero, Le carte piene di 
sogni. Testi e lettori in età moderna (Bologna: Il Mulino 2006).
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the population at that time did not know how to read, and there remained 
a clear distinction between literacy and familiarity with reading, between 
learning to read and learning through reading. In other words, knowing how 
to read did not necessarily mean that a person would actually read or acquire 
new knowledge.48 The “illiterates” and those who had rudimentary knowledge 
were thus divided by clearly distinguished degrees of culture that corresponded 
to different levels of access to knowledge.49 Gigliola Fragnito correctly writes 
that “there was the literacy of those who knew how to read and write, the 
semi-literacy of those who had varying degrees of ability to read, and absolute 
illiteracy.”50 The social and economic conditions that determined the level of 
a person’s education differed enormously, even among the illiterates.51 As we 
shall see, while some acquired the rudiments of an education in the home or 
the workshop, others were self-taught and built an education primarily on their 
contact with the book; some were able to attend parish schools, while others 
went to abacus schools. Having the means to attend a university or hire a top-
notch private tutor was therefore not the only factor discriminating between 
literates and illiterates.52 Moreover, literacy was by no means the only barrier 
48. Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent of Change: Communications and Cultural 
Transformations in Early-Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 65–66. On 
Eisenstein, see Anthony Grafton, “The Importance of Being Printed,” The Journal of Inderdisciplinary 
History 2 (1980): 265–86.
49. Paolo Trovato and Pietro Trifone have shown that literacy rate statistics for Renaissance Italy are 
unreliable because reading and linguistic skills generally varied not only among the different social 
classes but also within the same social class. See Trovato, 17–33; Pietro Trifone, Rinascimento dal Basso. 
Il nuovo spazio del volgare tra Quattro e Cinquecento (Rome: Bulzoni, 2006), 143–63.
50. Fragnito, Proibito capire, 269.
51. Roger Chartier suggests that “the printed word was familiar even to those who could not read, in 
workshops, in the Protestant churches, and in the festive confraternities. Addressed in common, taught 
by some and deciphered by others, deeply integrated into the life of the community, the printed word 
laid its mark on the urban culture of the popular masses. And it thus created a public, and therefore a 
market, beyond those who were literate and even those who read books. In fact, between 1530 and 1660, 
for the majority of the popular urban classes, the relation to the printed material is not a relation to 
books […].” Roger Chartier, “Culture as Appropriation: Popular Cultural Uses in Early Modern France,” 
in Understanding Popular Culture: Europe from the Middle Ages to the Nineteenth Century, ed. Steven L. 
Kaplan (Berlin: Mouton, 1984), 243. 
52. On education in Renaissance Italy with particular reference to vernacular teachings, see Grendler, 
Schooling in Renaissance Italy, 275–332; Robert Black, Humanism and Education in Medieval and 
Renaissance Italy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 275–81, 301–05.
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standing between the common people and the educated classes. The availability 
of vernacular works, whether printed or manuscript, not to mention their cost, 
and the existence of social occasions in which such works could be read aloud, 
were all factors that had a profound influence on the consumption of cultural 
products.
Why Aristotle’s works should be directed at social groups with such a 
low level of education is a moot question. An initial, if partial, answer may be 
found in the passages cited above. These works are most commonly described 
as “benefitting” such people and increasing their knowledge.53 There is also a 
second level where works have specific recipients and therefore also purposes 
that go beyond benefitting the person in a general sense. Antonio Scaino and 
Felice Figliucci, for instance, dedicate their works to men involved in politics 
who govern the city. Panfilo Persico is even more explicit in addressing his 
writings to princes and those who govern the republic and the court. Far from 
being uneducated, these social groups frequently had knowledge of classical 
languages, or at least some degree of erudition, but still it was easier for them to 
read in the vernacular rather than a language that was no longer spoken.54 The 
works of Benedetto Dottori and Ludovico Castelvetro were aimed at a similar, 
if not higher, cultural milieu: men of letters, poets, and literary critics. That 
both Dottori and Castelvetro addressed their writings to men of letters with 
a certain level of erudition who were therefore steeped in classical literature 
serves to explain the complexity of their works. Yet the fact that they were 
written in the vernacular instead of Latin, as would have been the case only 
thirty or forty years before, shows how profound a shift the studia humanitatis 
were going through, and how the new humanism conceived in the academies 
53. The benefit and accretion of knowledge they bestow are to serve all human beings in fulfilling their 
essence as rational beings who by their very nature wish to know, as Aristotle himself asserts at the 
beginning of the Metaphysica. And from this knowledge, again in Aristotelian terms, derives happiness, 
since happiness results from the fulfilment of one’s nature. Benefitting others, as we shall see in more 
detail below, is a duty that human beings must perform by virtue of the fact that a human being’s nature 
consists in the perfection of knowledge, which will also lead to the perfection of practical activities 
and therefore greater happiness. See Maria Pia Ellero, “I volgarizzamenti e la felicità mentale: l’umana 
perfezione nella Filosofia naturale di Alessandro Piccolomini,” in Lo scaffale della biblioteca scientifica 
in volgare (secoli XIII–XVI), ed. Rita Librandi and Rosa Piro (Florence: Sismel-Edizioni del Galluzzo, 
2006), 453–68.
54. A striking example is the Doge Leonardo Donà, who knew Latin, but read the Bible in the vernacular. 
See Fragnito, Proibito capire, 265.
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mostly spoke the vernacular rather than Latin. The Loica by Venetian phys-
ician Niccolò Massa, for instance, being addressed “not only to Philosophers 
and Rhetoricians, but also Grammarians, Historians, and other men of letters,” 
namely to all those who in the fifteenth century pursued the studia humanitatis, 
that is to say the humanists, is a case in point.55 Writing in the vernacular was 
no mere literary exercise for these new intellectuals: they were effectively ex-
panding the recipient base for Aristotelian texts.
For many vernacular writers, however, the educated upper classes were 
not the only intended recipients. Giovan Battista Gelli was animated by a need 
to teach philosophy also to woodcutters and apothecaries,56 while Claudio 
Tolomei viewed the knowledge of mechanics as an important acquisition for 
sculptors, painters, carpenters, and architects too.57 Mechanics, as Niccolò 
Tartaglia wrote in the frontispiece of his Scientia nova, was an important sub-
ject also for “bombardiers”—that is artillerymen and men of war — and not 
only for so-called “speculative mathematicians,”58 whereas Francesco Verino 
declared that the natural phenomena investigated in the Meteorologica would 
be of interest to any who read it, whether for “honour” or “pleasure,” simply 
because such phenomena give rise to “marvellous things,” or for practical pur-
poses,59 such as the paterfamilias, who must keep the home stocked with food, 
the doctor, who can discover the causes of diseases and their remedies, and 
navigators, both mercantile and military, who can anticipate adverse weather 
conditions. Works targeting specific recipient groups were usually concerned 
55. Niccolò Massa, Loica (Venice: Bindoni, 1549), frontmatter.
56. On the apothecary as a hub of information and communication, see Filippo De Vivo, “Pharmacies as 
Centres of Communication in Early Modern Venice,” Renaissance Studies 21 (2007): 505–21.
57. Tolomei Claudio, Delle lettere libri sette (Venice: Giolito, 1547), 82r–v: “Matters relating to 
architecture are very popular and widely practiced nowadays among men who have little knowledge of 
the Latin language, and likewise among sculptors, painters, master carpenters, and vulgar architects. 
[…] It will therefore be of benefit to the world to provide a new translation of Vitruvius in the beautiful 
Tuscan language […]” (“Le cose d’architettura sono disiderate assai e praticate oggidì da huomini che 
non hanno molta intelligenza di lingua latina, sì come scoltori, dipintori, maestri di legname, e 
architettori volgari. […] Farassi dunque ancor questo utile al mondo, traducendo nuovamente Vitruvio 
in bella lingua toscana […]”).
58. Niccolò Tartaglia, Inventione novamente trovata […] utilissima per ciascuno speculativo Mathematico, 
Bombardiero et altri intitolata Scientia nova (Sabbio: Venice, 1537), *ii. 
59. Craig Martin, “Meteorology for Courtiers and Ladies: Vernacular Aristotelianism in Renaissance 
Italy,” Philosophical Readings 2 (2012): 3–14.
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with ethical-political matters (ethics, politics, rhetoric), or applied sciences 
(mechanics and meteorology),60 and sometimes differed from Latin works 
in that they contained a practical knowledge that their public would apply.61 
Furthermore, that such targeted groups did not consist only of men is dem-
onstrated by Alessandro Piccolomini, some of whose works were written for 
women. In their roles as nannies and wet-nurses, women with access to cul-
ture were perfectly placed to become themselves vehicles in the education of 
children, who were in this manner exposed from their earliest years to works 
which were probably read to them in infancy, and which they would later go 
on to memorize.62 Hence we might say that a substantial cross-section of the 
population was the intended recipient of these works, and therefore that the 
cultural consumer base was thus greatly expanded.63
These were the “people” targeted by Aristotle’s vulgarizers.64 They includ-
ed “groups at the bottom, or on the margins, such as unskilled workers, hired 
labourers, peasants, or the poor,” and not only, as Andrea Zorzi has pointed 
60. It is important to note that “usually” does not mean “exclusively.” As we shall see, vernacular 
Aristotelianism was a theoretically engaged philosophical movement.
61. See for example the genre of advice written for politicians and governors in Valentina Lepri, Layered 
Wisdom: Early Modern Collections of Political Precepts (CLEUP: Padova, 2015).
62. Fragnito, Proibito capire, 275–87.
63. There were handbooks for teaching adults, such as artisans and women, to read without going to 
school. For sixteenth-century Rome, see Armando Petrucci, “Scrittura, alfabetismo ed educazione 
grafica nella Roma del primo Cinquecento: da un libretto di conti di Maddalena Pizzicarola in 
Trastevere,” Scrittura e civiltà 2 (1978): 163–207. For sixteenth-century Venice, see Piero Lucchi, “La 
Santacroce, il Salterio e il Babuino: Libri per imparare a leggere nel primo secolo della stampa,” Quaderni 
storici 38 (1978): 593–630; Piero Lucchi, “Leggere scrivere e abbaco: L’istruzione elementare agli inizi 
dell’età moderna,” in Scienze, credenze occulte, livelli di cultura (Florence: Olschki, 1982), 101–19; Paul 
F. Grendler, “What Zuanne Read in School: Vernacular Texts in Sixteenth Century Venetian Schools,” 
The Sixteenth Century Journal 13 (1982): 41–54; Anne Jacobson Schutte, “Teaching Adults to Read in 
Sixteenth-Century Venice: Giovanni Antonio Tagliente’s Libro Maistrevole,” Sixteenth Century Journal 
17 (1986): 3–16.
64. The historical and literary basis for the meaning of “people” adopted in this paper can be found 
in what may be considered the most important programmatic work of vernacular humanism in the 
Cinquecento: Pietro Bembo’s Prose della volgar lingua, where “people” is synonymous with “masses” 
(volgo), “commoners” (popolani), “populace” (genti), “multitude” (moltitudine), “uneducated” (non 
dotti), and also “peasants” (contadini). Unlike Aristotle’s vulgarizers, however, Pietro Bembo uses the 
term “people” in a derogatory sense and advances an aristocratic idea of culture in which “very few men 
in each century” have knowledge. Nonetheless, “people” was a general term used to designate low social 
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out in the context of political history, the “self-employed artisans organized in 
occupational guilds, skilled workers, masters and foremen, small traders and 
entrepreneurs, small property owners, notaries, teachers, and doctors,” all of 
whom established themselves in opposition to the “nobles” and the “knightly 
aristocracy.”65
In his Battaglie (1582), Girolamo Muzio wrote that the intention of every 
author is to “offer usefulness” and benefit “to lords and gentlemen; soldiers 
and sappers; merchants; men; women; the young; the old; the learned; the 
uneducated; in other words to everyone regardless of age and sex, whatever 
their condition.”66 The range of recipients presented by Muzio is as wide as the 
variety of themes that are to be treated, from Aristotelian philosophy to the 
most practical disciplines:
If you wish to treat of divine matters […] is it not more expedient to do so 
in Italian, so that those who know nothing of those beautiful things and 
lofty mysteries may learn them from you […]? I shall say the same about 
Philosophy, which contemplates nature; and even more so of ethics. […] 
But to speak of more particular things: wanting to write of the art of war, 
is it not right that the captains and soldiers should understand you? And 
of architecture, is it not best that the engineers and masters of workshops 
should be able to learn from our teachings? And of agriculture, does it 
not seem necessary for you that the men of the people should profit from 
them? And of arithmetic, should it not be your intention that even the 
classes or indistinct masses. See Pietro Bembo, Prose della volgar lingua, ed. Carlo Dionisotti (Torino: 
UTET, 1931), 31–32.
65. Andrea Zorzi, “The popolo,” in Italy in the Age of The Renaissance 1300–1550, ed. John M. Najemy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 145. 
66. Girolamo Muzio, Battaglie (Venice: Dusinelli, 1582), 160v: “Se voi volete trattar le cose divine […] 
non è più convenevole scriver Italicamente, a fine, che color, che non sanno quelle cose belle, & quegli 
alti misteri, gli apparino da voi […]? questo medesimo dirò io della Filosofia contemplatrice della natura; 
& della morale maggiormente. […] Ma per venire alle cose piu particolari: Volendo scrivere della arte 
della guerra, non è egli buono, che i Capitani, & i soldati vi intendano? Se di Architettura, non è egli 
convenevole, che gli ingegneri, & maestri delle fabbriche possano apprender i nostri ammaestramenti? 
Se di Agricolotura, non vi par necessario, che gli huomini del popolo ne possano trar utilità? Se di 
Arithmetica, non dee esser vostra intention, che anche gli huomini non letterati vi debbano poter 
leggere? […] Questo a me sembra, che officio sia di huomo letterato & di buon scrittore.”
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uneducated understand you? […] It seems to me that this is the task of the 
man of letters and the good writer.67
We can therefore speak in very concrete terms of a relationship between Aristotle 
and the people.68
It is natural to want to know at this point whether this public, these con-
sumers of Aristotelian vulgarizations, did in fact exist, or whether they were a 
completely invented fabrication, perhaps for commercial purposes just to sell 
more books to a greater number of people.69 Put differently, we might want to 
ask whether there was at least a partial correspondence between public and 
audience. Again, a preliminary study of the public is necessary to gain some 
insight into the nature of the audience, because someone who writes is writing 
for someone, for instance artisans, women, or merchants. In absolute terms, 
we might say, to quote Giovan Battista Gelli, that “anyone who writes does so 
for no other reason than that his things, preserved as letters, which do not dis-
appear like voices, may be understood by the whole world.”70 If the social groups 
to which such works were explicitly addressed had not existed as a prototype 
readership, or it had not been possible to create them as a new type of literary 
space, the writer would either not have written at all or he would have stopped 
writing altogether.71
67. Muzio, Battaglie, 187r–187v. On this passage, see Vittorio Coletti, Parole dal Pulpito. Chiesa e 
movimenti religiosi tra latino e volgare (Casale Monferrato: Marietti, 1983), 163.
68. Another possible definition of people is proposed by Roger Chartier following Daniel Roche: “I take 
‘popular classes’ to mean, by default, readers who did not belong to ‘the three robes’ […]: the black robe 
of the clerics; the short robe of the nobility; and the long robe of a varied group of low- or high-grade 
officials, lawyers, and attorneys, to which must be added the medical profession. Thus I identify the 
following as belonging to the ‘popular’ class: peasants, master craftsmen and their journeymen, and 
merchants, including those who have retired from business and style themselves ‘bourgeois.’” Chartier, 
“Culture as Appropriation,” 237–38.
69. Paolo Veneziani, “Il frontespizio come etichetta del prodotto,” in Il libro italiano del Cinquecento. 
Produzione e commercio (Rome: Istituto poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 1989), 99–125.
70. Gelli, 202.
71. It is in fact highly improbable that over three hundred works should have had an entirely fictional, 
hence not real, public whose sole purpose was to justify the use of the vernacular. Not only would 
such a conceit reduce vernacular works to a mere literary exercise, it would also effectively constitute 
a deliberate red herring on a collective scale, as if all vulgarizers, or at least most of them, had made a 
pact to address their works to a public that did not exist. Furthermore, the motivation and intentions 
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That such social groups did in fact exist is borne out by at least one factor 
that may be evinced from the parallel phenomenon of biblical vulgarizations 
promoted by reformist groups in Italy, but not, as one might expect, through 
those who supported an across-the-board program of religious re-education 
for the populace. Conservative intellectuals on all sides, who opposed the vul-
garization of knowledge, were reacting against an endeavour that was clearly 
proving successful, otherwise they would not have opposed vulgarizations so 
violently. This movement against vulgarizations and vulgarizers banishes all 
doubt regarding the possibility that the programmatic statements of vulgarizers 
were purely propagandistic, and therefore directed at a fictional, non-existent 
public. The Franciscan friar, Giovanni da Fano, wrote against the “Lutheran 
heresy” for the edification of those who were “illiterate and simple”; in other 
words, for “idiot men, women and children.”72 The very idea of extending 
knowledge to “cobblers, bronzesmiths, scrap metal merchants, butchers, dyers, 
wool cleaners, wool beaters, builders and blacksmiths,”73 not to mention “the 
behind such a masquerade en masse would require explaining, and there is simply nothing in the explicit 
statements of these intellectuals to suggest anything that might support such a view. One would have to 
build arguments on what was not said rather than what was said purely on the assumption that there can 
be no correspondence between audience and public in the various types of vulgarization. One would 
have to choose the “unspoken” facts of the historians over the direct statements of the sources. Even if 
this were possible, one would then have to explain how to talk about this “unspoken” material. As we 
have seen, vulgarization techniques and linguistic register are not always reliable indicators, because 
if these vulgarizations aim to educate, and not be mere literary exercises, the primary purpose is the 
improvement of knowledge, which means imparting information and language that a person did not 
have before, and are therefore difficult to understand. Any process of “instruction,” however “simplified,” 
requires raising the level of culture and providing a terminology and a knowledge that previously did 
not exist.
72. Giovanni Pili da Fano, Opera utilissima vulgare contra le pernitiosissime heresie lutherane per 
li simplici (Bologna: Phello, 1532), 1v. On Pili, see Silvano Cavazza, Luthero fedelissimo inimico de 
messer Jesu Christo. La polemica contro Lutero nella letteratura religiosa in volgare della prima metà del 
Cinquecento, in Lutero in Italia. Studi storici nel V centenario della nascita (Casale Monferrato: Marietti, 
1983), 67–94; Gian Luigi Betti, “Alcune considerazioni riguardo all’Incendio de zizanie lutherane di 
Giovanni da Fano pubblicato a Bologna nel 1532,” Archiginnasio. Bollettino della Biblioteca Comunale 
di Bologna 82 (1987): 235–43; Sebastiano da Potenza, “L’incendio di zizanie lutherane di p. Giovanni da 
Fano,” Italia francescana 36 (1961): 188–96, 426–31.
73. Lorenzo Davidico, Anotomia delli vitii (Florence, 1550), 327. See Massimo Firpo, Nel labirinto del 
mondo. Lorenzo Davidico tra santi, eretici, inquisitori (Florence: Olschki, 1992), 96–97; Massimo Firpo, 
Riforma protestante ed eresie nell’Italia del Cinquecento (Bari-Rome: Laterza, 1993), 10.
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tailors, the woodcutters, and other low-born scum”74 was hard to accept. Yet, 
as Dominican friar Ambrogio Catarino Politi, the great castigator of Antonio 
Brucioli, translator of the Bible and of Aristotle,75 was forced to admit, “human 
curiosity and presumption, […] has reached the point today that any person, 
whatever their circumstances, whether woman or man, whether idiot, unedu-
cated, or educated, wants to understand profound matters of sacred theology 
and Holy Scripture.”76 As this handful of testimonies indicates, the social classes 
mentioned by those who opposed the vulgarization of biblical lore were the 
very same recipient groups targeted by Aristotle’s vulgarizers, which suggests 
that such an audience not only existed but was capable of reading complex doc-
trines, a fact of no small concern to the religious authorities. And if they were 
capable of grasping the truth of the Bible, theology, and Revelation, one might 
argue that they were also capable of understanding the rational truths offered 
by philosophy, albeit partially and with some degree of effort. No doubt, the 
level of penetration of the Holy Scriptures was higher than that of the philo-
sophical texts, because there were more social chances to have contact with 
biblical message; nonetheless, the public was the same.
3. What does it mean to vulgarize?
That philosophical works could indeed be directed at groups at the bottom or on 
the margins such as illiterates, idiots, simple people, and labourers may indeed 
cause suspicion or raise doubts. Can Aristotle really have had such widespread 
influence and such large publics at a time when literacy rates were so low? How 
deeply did the knowledge of Aristotle penetrate society, reaching even the popu-
lace? Such questions would require a series of micro-historical and sociological 
studies of culture aimed at reconstructing the knowledge of the so-called lower 
74. Vincenzo Ferrini, Della lima universale de’ vitii (Venice: Giunti, 1607), 308r. All these accounts are 
examined in Firpo, “Riforma religiosa e lingua volgare nell’Italia del Cinquecento,” Belfagor 57 (2007): 
537–38.
75. Giorgio Spini, Tra Rinascimento e Riforma. Antonio Brucioli (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1940), 107. 
76. Ambrogio Catarino Politi, Compendio d’errori et inganni luterani contenuti in un libretto senza nome 
de l’autore, intitolato “Trattato utilissimo del benefitio di Christo crucifisso,” Roma, Ne la contrada del 
Pellegrino, ed. Massimo Firpo, in Benedetto da Mantova, Il beneficio di Cristo, ed. Salvatore Caponetto 
(Florence and Chicago: Sansoni / The Newberry Library, 1972), 347. On Politi, see Coletti, 139–40; 
Giorgio Caravale, Sulle tracce dell’eresia. Ambrogio Catarino Politi (1484–1553) (Florence: Olschki, 2007). 
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classes, studies that would be severely hampered by the volatile, oral nature of 
popular culture. At most, one could seek to reconstruct the book heritage, but 
this too would yield only a partial picture of the culture of the period. As Zemon 
Davis has rightly pointed out, common people did not need to collect books 
privately in order to have access to them: (1) they could purchase a book or a 
manuscript,77 and then sell it on once having read it; (2) reading groups could 
disseminate knowledge orally (for instance in rural areas78 or printing houses); 
(3) certain works, like those on mathematical calculus, were available in shops, 
and therefore accessible to apprentices as well as shopkeepers;79 (4) other works 
were intended to be distributed orally, such as sermons, songs, and speeches. 
It would therefore seem wiser, at this early stage in our inquiry, to focus on the 
general motivations that drove these vulgarizers and explain what “vulgarizing” 
meant to them.
To think that the transfer of Greco-Roman culture to vernacular culture 
necessarily entailed a simplification would be misguided.80 The widespread dis-
tribution of a vast number of theoretically demanding Aristotelian texts — for 
instance, on the question of the immortality of the soul, which until the 1540s 
was debated almost exclusively in the universities but thereafter became com-
mon currency in vernacular writings too81—flies in the face of the view that 
the vernacular was restricted to works of a purely informational nature, such as 
77. A key factor in the circulation of vernacular Aristotelian works was the widely used practice of 
personally transcribing manuscripts: printing “did not immediately displace the ms. trade […] The 
average library, whether public or private, contained mss. as well as printed books […] a doctor might 
have one treatise of Aristotle in printed form and another in ms. form”; George Sarton, Appreciation of 
Ancient and Medieval Science During the Renaissance 1450–1600 (New York: Barnes, 1958), 4.
78. Of particular interest, and characteristic of the times, are reading groups of women and Protestants. 
For the latter especially it was extremely dangerous to hold works that were considered heretical, and 
which were therefore frequently disseminated orally. See Fragnito, Proibito capire, 261–310.
79. On these points, Natalie Zemon Davis is emphatic; see her Society and Culture in Early Modern 
France, 212–13.
80. Loris Sturlese, “Filosofia in volgare,” in Filosofia in volgare nel Medioevo, ed. Loris Sturlese and Nadia 
Bray (Louvain-la-Neuve: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d’Etudes Médiévales, 2003), 9; Bianchi, 
“Volgarizzare Aristotele”, 493.
81. An example was recently provided in Marco Sgarbi, “Benedetto Varchi on the Soul: Vernacular 
Aristotelianism between Reason and Faith,” Journal of the History of Ideas 76 (2015): 1–23; Marco 
Sgarbi, Profumo d’immortalità. Controversie sull’anima nella filosofia volgare del Rinascimento (Rome: 
Carocci, 2016). 
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“the ‘secret books,’ or recipe books (pertaining to medicine, chemistry, cosmet-
ics, cookery, etc.), a type of publication that enjoyed great success, but which 
because of its empirical nature was markedly different from academic and sci-
entific treatises, which were generally written in Latin.”82 Vernacular treatments 
thus covered a wide range of topics, including many that were studied in the 
universities, the difference being that they were approached in different ways 
and from different perspectives.
The many different approaches to vulgarization gave rise to such a varied 
array of vernacular texts that it is difficult to generalize its process. Nonetheless, 
the use of the vernacular as opposed to Latin is justified in all these works by 
the underlying notion that to vulgarize meant above all else to make what had 
hitherto been the preserve of a restricted clique of intellectuals available to 
a much wider public. For Alessandro Piccolomini, perhaps the greatest vul-
garizer of Aristotelian works in the Cinquecento, the purpose of vulgarizing 
was “bringing those [Aristotelian] doctrines […] into our language, which is 
well suited […] to every science,” as well as “to untie, and open up, and il-
luminate a subject so as to make it accessible, and so open in its intelligence 
that any who are not entirely uncouth and without ability may understand it, 
at least most of it.”83 The techniques that were employed to make knowledge 
more accessible to any “uncouth and incapable” intellect, some of which we 
have already encountered in the examples cited above, differ from those used 
in straightforward translation. In the words of Piccolomini, a text may be vul-
garized by “translating, commenting, or even expounding, annotating, para-
phrasing, and abridging […] be it with pure comments, annotations, epitomes, 
or summaries.”84 Intellectuals frequently rejected literal translations, for which 
Piccolomini gives a number of reasons. First, translation requires “perfect 
knowledge of the language of the writer,” whereas a vulgarizer may rephrase, 
extend, or add clauses and sentences while remaining as close as possible to the 
author’s intended meaning. Second, a translator is more exposed to criticism, 
82. Claudio Marazzini, Storia della lingua italiana. Il secondo Cinquecento e il Seicento (Bologna: il 
Mulino, 1993), 30.
83. Alessandro Piccolomini, Copiosissima parafrase di M. Alessandro Piccolomini nel primo libro della 
Retorica di Aristotele (Venice: Varisco, 1565), 4–5. 
84. Alessandro Piccolomini, Annotationi di M. Alessandro Piccolomini, nel libro della Poetica d’Aristotele, 
con la traduttione del medesimo libro, in lingua volgare (Venice: Guarisco-Compagni, 1575), letter to the 
readers. Alessandro Piccolomini, La prima parte della filosofia naturale (Rome: Valgrisi, 1551), 1br–v.
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since, unlike in commentary or paraphrase, failure to adhere to a text is seen as 
a mistake. Third, one must have a firm grasp not only of the author’s language, 
but also of the content of the text. It is particularly difficult in Piccolomini’s 
view to find translators who are expert at correctly translating grammatical and 
syntactic structures as well as understanding the content of a text. Translators 
frequently focus on one or the other, either way failing to convey the author’s 
intended meaning. Worse by far is to translate mere linguistic form at the ex-
pense of content:
some […] without conveying, as they should, the meaning and the 
sentiment, proceed word-by-word, minimal particle by minimal particle, 
seeking to reproduce however many they find, taking care, as if they were 
counting them, not to short-change the end result, thus producing a 
garbled and insipid form of expression, and, what is worse, one that is for 
the most part unintelligible.85
This was, in Piccolomini’s view, the main problem with vulgarization. If to vul-
garize means to transmit knowledge, then properly conveying the content and 
message of the text took precedence over translating the words — a position that 
was not as unique in the panorama of Aristotelian vulgarizations as one might 
think.
Far from being a merely hypothetical statement, what Piccolomini is de-
scribing here is the general state of vulgarization in the Cinquecento. Statistically 
speaking, only 16 percent of all vernacular Aristotelian works were proper 
translations. Treatises were most common at 29 percent, followed by summar-
ies and compendia at 24 percent, dialogues at 18 percent, and paraphrases at 
3 percent. Less numerous than translations were commentaries at 5 percent, 
lectures and speeches at 4 percent, and letters at a mere 1 percent.86 Translation 
was therefore not the first choice of method for vulgarizing Aristotle’s 
85. Piccolomini, Annotationi, letters to the readers: “alcuni […] senza a procurare, come far doverebbero, 
principalmente la sententia, & il sentimento, vanno di parola in parola, & di minima particella in 
particella cercando di recarne a punto tante, quante ve ne truovano, & guardandosi, come se le havesser 
prese a conto, di non defraudar in restituirle nel numero, vengono a produrre una sorte di locutione 
confusa, insipida, & quel ch’è peggio, per la maggior parte inintelligibile.”
86. Statistics are grounded in Vernacular Aristotelianism in Renaissance Italy Database (=VARI): 
http://warwick.ac.uk/vernaculararistotelianismdatabase. See Eugenio Refini, “Per un database 
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philosophy. The method of vulgarization was an important factor in deter-
mining how many recipients were reached, as a closer examination of these 
works divided by genre will reveal. Summaries, compendia, and dialogues, 
which combined account for 42 percent, or almost half of the total number 
of vulgarizations, were the most accessible, meaning that they were easier and 
more likely to attract a large number of recipients, despite sometimes, albeit 
infrequently, over-simplifying the material. Translations, on the other hand, 
along with commentaries and paraphrases, while accounting for a good 24 per-
cent of the total number of works, frequently adopted complex terminology, 
sometimes transposed directly from Greek and Latin, and tended to become 
embroiled in lengthy disquisitions on difficult and complex passages, which 
deserved fuller treatment.
In many of the cases examined above, to vulgarize philosophical con-
tent meant also to popularize it; in other words, to reach the common people 
with content that was traditionally not intended for them. For those who were 
not used to a particular type of language or certain kinds of ideas, rhetorical 
devices could be used to aid understanding and provide greater access to philo-
sophical content. Such was the case with the Aristotelian Francesco Robortello, 
who viewed rhetoric as a useful aid to making philosophy easier to understand 
and more relevant for a wider public. Like Piccolomini, Robortello was well 
aware that the process of making philosophical content more comprehensible 
could result in the failure to accurately convey the ideas of the source text, but 
this was not equivalent to deceiving or conveying knowledge in an erroneous 
or simplified form. Rather it meant making the acquisition of in-depth and 
detailed knowledge possible for all kinds of people. In his De artificio dicendi 
(1567), Robortello demonstrates how rhetoric and oratory can be used to make 
philosophical truth accessible to common people. The task of rhetoric was to 
clarify knowledge, thus enabling common people to make informed judgments 
of their own about what they were learning.87 The real problem for Robortello 
was that philosophy used abstract words that few could understand, while 
the people wanted words that denoted concrete objects and could instantly 
be understood, and therefore also shared. This was the key to translating and 
dell’aristotelismo volgare in Italia (c. 1400–c. 1650),” in “Aristotele fatto volgare”: Tradizione aristotelica e 
cultura volgare nel Rinascimento, ed. D.A. Lines and E. Refini (Pisa: ETS, 2015), 201–06.
87. Francesco Robortello, De artificio dicendi (Bologna: Benati, 1567), 9r–v.
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vulgarizing philosophical discourse. Robortello identified four different ways 
to popularize philosophy; in other words, to make a difficult philosophical 
text accessible to a wider range of recipients. The first was to make an abstract 
notion more concrete by means of the rhetorical inference of example: one 
specific case was valid for all other similar cases. The second was to transform 
a universal concept into a particular concept. Thus, for instance, in moral phil-
osophy one should deal with happiness not according to its definition but in 
reference to the happy man.88 The third was to use metaphor to convey philo-
sophical concepts. The fourth was to employ as many words and phrases as 
were necessary to explain and clarify a philosophical concept.89 Rhetoric for 
Robortello was thus a way of reaching a wider public, but it did not necessarily 
mean trivializing philosophy. On the contrary, Robortello’s guiding principle 
was first to explain specific terms in the various arts and sciences, also with ref-
erence to their meanings in Greek and Latin, and only then to give a translation 
in the common vernacular language.90 This, for him, was the only way to raise 
the cultural level of the people.
Undoubtedly one of the most difficult aspects of vulgarizing and popu-
larizing an Aristotelian text was the fact that vulgarizers were typically highly 
cultured intellectuals who had to adopt the point of view of the common per-
son in order to see how best to make philosophical content more accessible. 
The “lower standpoint” was in fact rarely adopted: intellectuals still wrote as 
intellectuals, not as common people, but this does not mean that they did not 
want to popularize or vulgarize knowledge, and that there were such instances 
of empathy cannot be ruled out. It means simply that they were unable to write 
in a register that differed from the elevated manner to which they had been 
accustomed through education. The study of linguistic register is therefore 
useful only in determining whether a text was easy or difficult to understand;91 
88. Biblioteca Nazionale, Napoli, Ms. V D 45, f. 70r.
89. Biblioteca Nazionale, Napoli, Ms. V D 45, f. 70v.
90. Robortello, De artificio dicendi, 15v.
91. Alessio Cotugno’s seminal investigations show how the accessibility of a text depends on the various 
linguistic registers that are used. He clearly proves that Piccolomini’s works on Aristotle’s poetics 
employed a more accessible register than Castelvetro’s Poetica. See Alessio Cotugno, “Piccolomini e 
Castelvetro traduttori della ‘Poetica’ (con un contributo sulle modalità dell’esegesi aristotelica nel 
Cinquecento,” Studi di lessicografia italiana, 23 (2007): 113–219; Alessio Cotugno, “Le ‘Annotationi’ 
di Piccolomini e la ‘Poetica’ di Castelvetro a confronto: tecnica argomentativa, vocabolario critico, 
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however, it provides no basis for arguing that there could be no intentional 
public because the language was too complex.
This should alert us to the dangers of thinking that the culture of the 
people and the culture for the people are one and the same;92 that is to say, 
conflating a series of cultural practices that originate with the people and a type 
of knowledge produced for them by the educated classes, as in the case of the 
vulgarization and popularization of knowledge.93
Vulgarizations were for the most part, if not always, the work of cultured 
individuals, and their readers might of course include men and women who 
were capable of reading even the most complex works in Latin, not only “idiots” 
or “illiterates.” It is therefore wrong to identify them with popular works associ-
ated with a particular group of readers.94 Likewise it is erroneous to attribute an 
elevated linguistic register to an elevated audience, especially in light of explicit 
statements made by an author regarding a lower-level public and in view of the 
fact that the ultimate aim of these intellectuals was to instruct.95
Hence this whole process of “democratizing” knowledge is to be under-
stood as an extension of knowledge through the vernacular in opposition to 
dispositivi esegetici,” in Forms of Conflict and Rivalries in Renaissance Europe, ed. David A. Lines, 
Marc Laureys, and Jill Kraye (Göttingen: V&R Unipress / Bonn University Press, 2015), 161–206. In 
particular, his methodology of research on the management of information may in time reveal in detail 
the complexity of the text. See Cotugno, “Piccolomini e Castelvetro traduttori della ‘Poetica,’” 180. He 
correctly argues that complexity can stand in the way of a text’s readability, but it cannot be used as 
evidence to affirm that these texts were directed at a higher public than intended.
92. Carlo Ginzburg, Il formaggio e i vermi (Torino: Einaudi, 1976), xv.
93. Roger Chartier, Lectures et lecteurs dans la France d’Ancien Régime (Paris: Seuil, 1987), 7–17.
94. Contrary to the commonly held view that vernacular books were written for the lower classes 
and therefore reflected their tastes (such was the fate, according to Ginzburg, of Mikhail Bakhtin in 
Rabelais and His World), evidence shows that the most successful works were “not those written for 
the lower classes, but those that were written for different groups of readers.” See Eisenstein, 63. On 
this question, Chartier writes that “it is pointless to try to identify popular culture by some supposedly 
specific distribution of cultural objects. Their distribution is always more complex than it might seem at 
first glance, as are their appropriations by groups and individuals” (Chartier, “Culture as Appropriation,” 
233).
95. As Roger Chartier correctly argues concerning the story of the miller Domenico Scandella narrated 
by Carlo Ginzburg, “the books he read were in no way especially designed for a popular audience” 
(“Culture as Appropriation,” 233–34). Of course, Chartier points out, common people “did not, by any 
means, read everything read by the notables but the books they acquired were not specific to their class” 
(240).
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the Latin-based culture to include a broader social base and therefore a greater 
number of people. We are still a long way from the mass knowledge or culture 
of today, of course, but we are looking at knowledge that reaches diverse social 
strata and therefore expands the number of cultural consumers.
However one looks at it, vulgarization is a “downwards movement” that 
exemplifies the complexity of connections and exchanges of knowledge that 
took place among “low,” “medium,” and “high” culture, or at least between 
different social and cultural classes. The vernacular language was never used 
innocently, but at least in the Renaissance it often accompanied a desire to 
transmit and disseminate knowledge, especially concerning philosophical 
and scientific texts. The “downwards movement,” or the attempt to make the 
content of knowledge accessible to a greater number of people, may in fact 
be considered an initial phase in a process whose ultimate goal was to gener-
ate a subsequent “upwards movement” with the creation of a culture and an 
intellectual interest that had not existed until that time. This is borne out by 
Oreste Vannocci Biringucci’s already mentioned Lettera ai lettori to the Sopra 
le Mechaniche d’Aristotele,96 in which the explicitly stated purpose is to facilitate 
knowledge, make it public, and ensure that “good minds are put on a par with 
uncouth minds, and those who are notable and important with those who are 
low-caste and plebeian.”97 This leads us to the conclusion that even complicated 
and highly elaborate linguistic works of vulgarization such as Castelvetro’s were 
not symptomatic of a closure of knowledge or a restriction of the audience, but 
were in fact an attempt to improve the knowledge of those who had no classical 
education, or were more comfortable reading in their own native tongue.98 This 
was a clear indication that the vernacular was ripe for tackling involved specu-
lative and theoretical questions, as well as taking on the role of a language of 
culture and an instrument of emancipation.99
96. The work was published in 1547 in Latin, in his own words much to the regret of Biringucci, with the 
title In mechanicas quaestiones Aristotelis paraphrasis paulo quidem plenior.
97. Piccolomini, Sopra le Mechaniche d’Aristotele, 4.
98. The same applies today when teaching philosophy to those who have no concept of the discipline. As 
with the vulgarizers, the content is not trivialized, nor is the register lowered, but strategies are sought 
that will clarify the meaning. To trivialize knowledge when the purpose is to increase it would be a job 
badly done indeed.
99. Cotugno clearly shows that some vernacular works used a linguistic complexity similar to those 
written in Latin, just because the vernacular aimed to supplant Latin as a language of culture. The elevated 
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4. A new conception of knowledge for all
Although Latin was still the main language of scientific and erudite discourse 
in the Renaissance, the vernacular was already taking its first steps towards 
asserting “its own dignity and capacity for expressing even the most abstruse 
philosophical concepts,”100 making them accessible to people. In his Dialogo 
delle lingue (1542), Sperone Speroni sought to transform the vernacular into a 
language of philosophy and science that would eventually supplant Greek and 
Latin even in erudite circles, and therefore become the vehicle for the transmis-
sion of knowledge. Contrary to what some fourteenth- and fifteenth-century 
humanists believed, Speroni asserted that knowledge of Greek and Latin was 
not necessary to understanding Aristotle, and even that “the study of Greek and 
Latin is the cause of our ignorance.”101 Thus, he claims,
May God will it that for the benefit of those who will come after me all the 
books of all the sciences, as many as can be counted in Greek and Latin, 
some scholarly and generous person dedicate himself to rendering into 
the vernacular, so that the number of good philosophers would be greater 
than it is now, and their excellence rarer.102
linguistic register is explainable also by this process of substitution of one language with another; while 
the fact that the intended public was higher than what this intellectual, whose aim was to improve 
knowledge, explicitly stated, does not constitute a clue. See Alessio Cotugno, “Osservazioni linguistiche 
sull’ ‘Instrumento della filosofia’ di Alessandro Piccolomini (1551). Testualità, lessico, procedimenti 
espositivi,” in “Aristotele fatto volgare”: Tradizione aristotelica e cultura volgare nel Rinascimento, ed. D. A. 
Lines and E. Refini (Pisa: ETS, 2015), 99–148.
100. Tullio Gregory, Origini della terminologia filosofica moderna. Linee di ricerca (Florence: Olschki, 
2006), 72.
101. Sperone Speroni, Dialogo delle lingue (Pescara: Libreria dell’Università, 1999), 188. On this 
“revolutionary” conception, see Cesare Vasoli, “Sperone Speroni: La filosofia e lingua. L’ombra del 
Pomponazzi e un programma di volgarizzamento del sapere,” in Il volgare come lingua di cultura dal 
Trecento al Cinquecento, ed. Arturo Calzona, Francesco Paolo Fiore, Alberto Tenenti, and Cesare Vasoli 
(Florence: Olschki, 2003), 342.
102. Speroni, Dialogo delle lingue, 184: “Dio volesse in servigio di chi verrà dopo me, che tutti i libri 
d’ogni scientia quanti ne sono greci, et latini, alcuna dotta, et pietosa persona si desse a render volgari, 
che per certo il numero de i boni philosophanti sarebbe più spesso, che egli non è, et più rara diverrebbe 
la loro excellentia.” The mimetic nature of Speroni’s text makes it difficult to attribute any particular 
position to the Paduan intellectual, but when we compare it to other texts, and above all to the manner 
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Speroni looks forward to the day when “of every thing in every country I 
may speak every language,” and the sciences and arts shall no longer be under 
the dominance of the classical languages.103 Yet his ambition goes further still. 
He hopes
[…] through reason to be capable of communicating to others their 
affections and their own doctrine, with their own language, therefore to 
translate the philosophy sown by our Aristotle in the fields of Athens 
from Greek into the vernacular, be it Italian or German, which would 
not be like throwing it among the stones in the woods where it would 
become infertile, on the contrary it would make something distant close, 
something foreign a citizen of all provinces […] in this way the Peripatetic 
speculations would become far more familiar to us, and domestic such as 
they are not at present, and they would be easier to treat, and would be 
understood by us if some learned man should translate them from Greek 
into the vernacular.104
Speroni believes that all the languages of the world can signify and express philo-
sophical matters, but he also recognizes that it is still expedient to discuss sci-
ence in the classical languages simply because it is still customary to do so. This, 
however, does not mean that philosophy cannot be discussed in Mantuan or 
Milanese.105 Philosophy should not be ashamed of being expressed in Lombard 
rather than Greek or Latin words; indeed, it “does not disdain to find its place 
in which it was received, the most cogent perspective appears to be the one espoused by Scolare in 
reporting the arguments of Pomponazzi. The same opinion is held by Mario Pozzi, in Trattatisti del 
Cinquecento (Ricciardi: Milan, 1978), 619.
103. Speroni, Dialogo delle lingue, 188.
104. Speroni, Dialogo delle lingue, 192: “[…] poter di ragione comunicare con altrui gli affetti, et la 
dottrina di sé, con la sua lingua medesma, dunque tradurre la philosophia seminata dal nostra Aristotele 
ne i campi d’Athene, di greco in volgar, italiano, o tedesco, non serebbe gettarla tra’ sassi ne i boschi, 
ove sterile divenisse, anzi sarebbe far lei di lontana propinqua, et di forestiera cittadina d’ogni provincia 
… così le speculationi peripathetice ci diverrebbono assai più familiari, et domestice che non sono al 
presente, et più facilmente si tratterebbono, et intenderebbono da noi se di greco in volgar alcun dotto 
homo le convertisse.”
105. Speroni, Dialogo delle lingue, 194.
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in the minds of Lombards,”106 just as it did not disdain to be manifested among 
common people who had no knowledge of Greek or Latin.
After Speroni, the vernacular “was perceived increasingly as the vehicle 
for disseminating philosophy and the sciences beyond the schools and con-
quering a different public, but above all for overcoming the restrictions and 
limitations of the traditional culture upheld by scholastic Latin.”107 This is not 
merely a question about the legitimacy of the vernacular as a language of cul-
ture, since the vernacular itself has now acquired value “as an instrument of 
emancipation and cultural innovation.”108 The case of Galileo Galilei offers us 
a clear picture of how intellectuals viewed the vernacular language. Aware as 
he was that the vernacular was more limiting than Latin in terms of the inter-
national reach of his ideas, he nevertheless believed that Italian would someday 
become a language of culture, and in any case wished to “distance himself in 
protest from the erudite caste.”109 It was at this time that the defence of the 
vernacular language rested upon the newfound awareness that any culture is 
above all an ongoing transmission of prior experiences that lead, when trans-
ferred to other contexts, to transformations in all areas of knowledge. At a time 
when the official knowledge of the Church and the universities was perceived 
to be stagnating, it was “the vernacular, not Latin, that opened up new cultural 
horizons.”110
As we have seen, Aristotle’s vulgarizers and members of reformist circles 
shared the notion of the vernacular as the new language of culture and principle 
of emancipation from authority, often becoming identified with one another in 
the process. Two cases may serve here to illustrate that these movements were 
not only coeval, but also deeply entwined and united by the idea of spreading 
knowledge beyond the class of university intellectuals and the clergy.
106. Speroni, Dialogo delle lingue, 200. Another participant in the dialogue finds it abhorrent to “see 
Aristotle’s philosophy written in the Lombard language and hear it being discussed by all manner of 
uncouth people, porters, peasants, boatmen, and other such people.”
107. Gregory, 72.
108. Gregory, 72.
109. On Galileo’s conception of the vernacular, see Marazzini, Storia della lingua italiana. Il secondo 
Cinquecento e il Seicento, 58. On Galileo’s conception of knowledge, see Nick Wilding, Galileo’s Idol: 
Gianfrancesco Sagredo and the Politics of Knowledge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014).
110. Gregory, 72.
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The first is the case of Antonio Brucioli. The problem for Brucioli went 
far beyond the debate about the legitimacy of vulgarizing Holy Scripture or 
Aristotelian texts:111 his objective was to make the truth available to all people.112 
As he writes in the dedicatory letter to King Francis of France in his translation 
of the New Testament,
And to those who piously say that it is dangerous to put this light before 
common eyes because it contains difficult and dark things, which the 
simple people are not given to understanding and therefore risk being 
led astray, I shall say first of all that they should take the matter up with 
the Holy Spirit, who wanted to reveal these high secrets to simple people 
and idiots, judging them to be more worthy because their heads were not 
cluttered with worldly wisdom.113
Vernacular translations are not only important, therefore, but also a duty, be-
cause otherwise there would be no way of explaining why Christ “sent the Holy 
Spirit to make illiterate men speak and be understood in all languages.”114 The 
vernacular for Brucioli is therefore the medium through which to reveal to the 
people all those secrets which Latin, Greek, and Hebrew keep hidden. Brucioli 
attacks those in the upper classes who withhold power by preventing the circu-
lation of knowledge and the understanding of the truth. As the passage above 
goes on to assert:
111. Franco Pierno has shown that Brucioli applied his conception even to Boccaccio’s Decamerone; see 
Franco Pierno, “Il modello linguistico decameroniano e il suo rapporto con il volgare nel pensiero di 
Antonio Brucioli,” Cahiers d’études italiennes 8 (2008): 99–114.
112. Almost all the following passages from Brucioli’s writings have been examined by distinguished 
scholars like Paolo Simoncelli, Massimo Firpo, and Gigliola Fragnito, but they have never been related 
to the vulgarization of Aristotle.
113. Antonio Brucioli, La Biblia (Venice: Giunti 1532), dedication: “Et a quegli che dicono sotto specie 
di pietà ch’egli è cosa pericolosa a mettere questa luce avanti agli occhi de’ vulgari per esservi cose difficili 
et oscure, le quali le semplice genti non possono così bene comprendere et che potrieno essere causa di 
fargli errare, dico primieramente che questi tali contendino con lo spirito santo, che volle a’ semplici et 
idioti manifestare quegli alti secreti, giudicandone quegli più degni non havendo le menti gonfiate di 
mondana sapientia.”
114. Brucioli, La Biblia, dedication. 
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[…] I say that the difficult and dark things are few, and pose no threat to 
simple minds, for whom it is an easy matter to defer to others when they 
do not understand something, unlike the Greek and Latin men, for whom 
the dangers have always been far greater and far more serious, because 
maligning they have wanted to know more than was necessary, because 
those passages that are so fraught with difficulty and danger have never 
led anyone astray except those who because of languages and scientific 
knowledge have thought of themselves as important, and because of them 
have wanted to prove themselves to be more knowledgeable than others, 
and hence have fallen into real shadow.115
In the dedication to Renata, Duchess of Ferrara, in his I sacrosanti libri del vec-
chio testamento, Brucioli declares that he has undertaken the translation of the 
Bible
Prompted by those who, erring grievously, declare it not to be a good 
thing that Holy Scripture should exist in our vernacular, and through 
it be expressed so that it may become known to all, saying that in this 
manner divine speech is brought to vulgar ears […] these enemies of the 
divine word […] say that things lose their credibility and venerability 
to the extent that they are known by many, and many are allowed to 
participate, and these wise fools of the world are unaware that those things 
that appear great, and of greatest benefit to us, the more they are inquired 
into, and the more common they become, and widely known, the more 
their reputation and venerability will grow, yet just as the truth is the 
opposite of falsehood, […] so they proceed, and just as falsity always seeks 
to remain hidden, and truth to reveal itself, so too do false religions seek to 
conceal themselves and cover themselves as much as possible with terrors 
and the veils of ceremony, hiding their own truths from view, but that 
115. Brucioli, La Biblia, dedication: “[…] dico che poche sono, et di nessuno pericolo a le semplici menti 
[le cose difficili et oscure], le quali facilmente si rimettono a altri in quelle cose che esse non intendono, 
ma bene di maggiore et più grave pericolo sono state sempre a gli huomini Greci, et Latini, che hanno 
malignando voluto sapere più di quello che bisogna sapere, perché que’ luoghi che allegheranno questi 
di difficultà, et pericolo, non si truova che conducessino a mala via se non quegli che per le lingue, et 
scientie, hanno pensato di essere qualche cosa, et da quegli presa la occasione volsono mostrare di 
sapere più che gli altri, et caddono in manifeste tenebre.”
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which is true wants, unlike that which is false, to be manifest to all, known 
by all, so that the good that it brings may be seen clearly, and may lift 
us all out of falsehood, so that the greater the number of those who gain 
knowledge of it, the more its glory shall grow, and the greater and better 
its fruit shall be.116
Truth and knowledge could not be concealed, but needed revealing to as many 
people as possible to bear the best fruit. Brucioli had already dwelt at length on 
this problem in 1532 in the Biblia, where he writes to Francis I:
Some will perhaps exclaim that it is unworthy for a woman or a cobbler 
to discourse on Holy Scripture, and should understand them through 
reading, when it is better to understand them in the simplicity of the heart 
than in the elevation of science, and to hear speak of the virtue of the spirit 
to similar simple idiot souls than certain grand masters who with their 
well-founded philosophy sully the word of God. […] Do we want to hide 
this evangelical light from those devout and simple minds who wish to see 
it, as if it had been sent from heaven just for the educated?117
116. Antonio Brucioli, I sacrosanti libri del vecchio testamento, vol. 1 (Venice: Zanetti, 1540), dedication: 
“mosso da quegli, che grandemente errando, dicano non essere ben fatto, che essa divina scrittura sia 
nella nostra lingua vulgare, & in essa dichiarata, talmente che possa essere nota a ciascuno, dannando, 
che così si mettino agli orecchi del vulgo i parlari divini […] questi adversarii del verbo divino […] 
dicano che le cose tanto perdano di riputazione, & venetratione quanto più sono note a assai, & che assai 
ne sono fatti partecipi, non si accorgendo questi stolti sapienti del mondo, che quelle cose che sempre 
appaiono maggiori, & di maggior frutto alla nostra salute, quanto più si ricerca quali esse sieno, & 
quanto più sono communi, & da più conosciute, più crescano di nome & di reverentia, ma come la verità 
è contraria alla falsità, […] così per contrario modo fra loro procedono, & come la falsità sempre cerca 
di stare occulta, & la verità farsi palese, così le false religioni cercano di occultarsi, et coprirsi quanto 
sia loro possibile, sotto terrori, & velami di ceremonie, fuggendo l’esserne ricercata la verità, ma la vera 
vuole essere, per contrario modo dalla falsa, a tutti palese, da tutti conosciuta, accio che si vegga il bene 
che essa apporta, & levi ogniuno dalla falsità, in modo che quanti più ne hanno la cognitione, più ne 
viene grande la gloria sua & maggiore, & migliore il suo frutto.”
117. Brucioli, La Biblia, dedication: “Esclameranno forse alcuni essere indegna cosa che una donna, 
o uno calzolaio, parli de le sacre lettere, et quelle intenda leggendo, quando meglio è intenderle in 
semplicità di cuore, che in elevazione di scientia, et udire parlare a simili anime semplici idiote de la 
virtù de lo spirito che certi sommi maestri, che con la loro sana philosophia maculano la parola di Dio. 
[…] vogliamo ascondere questa luce evangelica a le devote e semplici menti, che desiderano di vederla 
come se per i soli litterati fusse mandata dal cielo?”
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In Brucioli’s view, therefore, everyone has access to truth and the sciences be-
cause they were given to us to be “understood by the pious and modest idiot 
as much as by the arrogant philosopher.”118 Culture is therefore just as available 
to “the blind, the lame, the beggar, the publican, centurions, sappers, women, 
and children,” as to “the merchant, the blacksmith, the farmer, the builder, the 
fisherman, the publicans, and all the conditions of men, and women.”119 In the 
“communication of truth” there must be “no difference between people, ages, 
bodies, or circumstances,” because knowledge is God-given.120 Brucioli includes 
the philosophical vulgarizations of Plato and Aristotle in the transmission of 
truth:121
And if this divine knowledge in one and the other testament, and in Plato 
and Aristotle, and in all the others, was written in those languages that 
were spoken at that time, if now they are not spoken, why then should 
these truths not be read in the languages that are in use now, and therefore 
understood by more people, since the benefit is greater the more people 
participate in it.122
The ultimate aim for Brucioli, as for the other Aristotelian vulgarizers, was to 
facilitate the acquisition of knowledge in as many people as possible. With this 
purpose in mind, he embarked upon the translation of a sizeable portion of the 
Aristotelian corpus, and in the time-span of twelve years published La Rettorica 
d’Aristotile tradotta con la sposizione di Rocco Catanio (1545), Gli otto libri del-
la Republica che chiamono Politica di Aristotile (1547), La Phisica di Aristotile 
(1551), Aristotile della generatione et corrutione (1552), De celo et mondo (1552), 
La meteora (1555), Di Aristotile libri tre dell’anima (1557).
118. Brucioli, La Biblia, dedication. 
119. Brucioli, La Biblia, dedication. 
120. Brucioli, La Biblia, dedication. 
121. Brucioli, La Biblia, dedication. 
122. Ibid.: “Et se questa divina scientia de l’uno & l’altro testamento, & la Platonica, & l’Aristotelica, 
& tutte le altre, in quelle lingue furno scritte, che all’hora si parlavono, se hora più naturalmente non 
si parlano, perché non si debbe leggere questa verità in quelle lingue che sono in uso, & da più intese, 
essendo uno bene tanto maggiore, quanto da più è partecipato.”
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The second case, no less important than the first, is that of Giovan Battista 
Gelli.123 The son of a modest artisan, Gelli never translated any Aristotelian 
works into Italian, but he was a skilful vulgarizer of Aristotelian ideas in philo-
sophical dialogues that bordered on heresy. The importance of his work in 
this context rests on the direct link he established between the methods used 
to vulgarize Holy Scripture and those adopted with the works of Aristotle. In 
I capricci del Bottaio (1546), Gelli develops the Speronian idea that “it is not 
languages that make men cultured, but the sciences, and one learns languages 
in order to gain knowledge of the sciences they contain.”124 The knowledge of 
sciences is not a direct consequence of the knowledge of languages, and many 
who know Greek and Latin may not have any understanding of the sciences. 
Knowledge, whether transmitted in the vernacular or in one of the classical 
languages, comes with “great effort.” Learning the classical languages before 
embarking upon the acquisition of knowledge only adds to the effort, hence, 
if all the sciences were already written in one’s native language, a man “would 
not have to spend four to six of his best years learning a language only to use it 
to move on to studying the sciences.”125 Like Sperone Speroni and Alessandro 
Piccolomini, Gelli viewed the fact that the sciences were written in Latin or 
Greek as an obstacle to the advancement of knowledge. The problem therefore 
is to understand why the “literati are so hostile towards those who translate 
something” into the vernacular.126 These so-called literati seem to think that the 
vernacular is not suitable for translating such elevated matters as Holy Scripture 
123. On Gelli, see Armand L. De Gaetano, Gianbattista Gelli and the Florentine Academy: The Rebellion 
against Latin (Florence: Olschki, 1976); Vittoria Perrone Compagni, “Cose di filosofia si possono dire in 
volgare. Il programma culturale di Giambattista Gelli,” in Il volgare come lingua di cultura dal Trecento al 
Cinquecento, ed. Arturo Calzona, Francesco Paolo Fiore, Alberto Tenenti, and Cesare Vasoli (Florence: 
Olschki, 2003), 301–37; Eva Del Soldato, “Aristotelici, accademici ed eretici. Simone Porzio e Giovan 
Battista Gelli,” in Simone Porzio, An homo bonus vel malus volens fiat (Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura: 
Rome, 2005), v–xxix; Chiara Cassiani, Metamorfosi e conoscenza. I dialoghi e le commedie di Giovan 
Battista Gelli (Rome: Bulzoni 2006); Anna Laura Puliafito, Volgarizzamento e propaganda: Giovan 
Battista Gelli e l’Accademia fiorentina, in Mecenati, artisti e pubblico nel Rinascimento, ed. L. Secchi 
Tarugi (Florence: Cesati, 2009), 640–55; Anna Laura Puliafito, “Filosofia, letteratura e vita civile: Giovan 
Battista Gelli e il volgare,” Modernidades 11 (2011), 1–15.
124. Gelli, 195.
125. Gelli, 198.
126. Gelli, 200.
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or philosophy because it detracts from their “reputation.”127 But this is not an 
adequate explanation in Gelli’s view, since “all languages […] are capable of 
expressing the concepts and needs of those who speak them.”128 The real reason 
is another, and it is quickly stated: “the accursed jealousy and desire they have 
to be viewed as better than others.”129 Gelli goes on to support his thesis with a 
fictional dialogue that shows how the intellectuals of the time viewed vulgariz-
ation as a democratization of knowledge that was aimed primarily at those who 
did not know the classical languages:
I recall finding myself recently in the presence of certain literati, one of 
whom said that Bernardo Segni had translated Aristotle’s Rhetoric into 
the vernacular, to which another replied that he had performed a great 
disservice; and when asked why, he said: “Because it is not good that every 
uneducated person should be allowed to know what another has acquired 
over many years with great effort from Greek and Latin books.130
Gelli is openly critical of this miserly approach to knowledge, writing that these 
are “inappropriate words […] not […] only for a Christian, but also for any hu-
man being!”131 The desire to keep knowledge under wraps is not only anti-Chris-
tian, therefore; it is in fact contrary to the very nature of the human being, whose 
task is to “love all and help others […], the greatest gift to whom is to aid their 
understanding.”132 Hence Gelli believes “that there is nothing more useful and 
praiseworthy” than translating into the vernacular that which is most neces-
sary, namely the precepts of religion and the principles of philosophy. If it were 
127. Gelli, 201.
128. Gelli, 201.
129. Gelli, 201.
130. Gelli, 201: “io mi ricordo che ritrovandomi a questi giorni dove erano certi litterati, e dicendo 
uno che Bernardo Segni aveva fatto volgare la Retorica d’Aristotele, uno di loro disse che egli aveva 
fatto un gran male; e domandato della ragione, rispose: “Perché e’ non istà bene ch’ogni volgare abbia 
a sapere quello che un altro si arà guadagnato in molti anni con gran fatica su pe’ libri greci e latini.” 
On the importance of Segni as a translator of Aristotle, see David A. Lines, “Rethinking Renaissance 
Aristotelianism: Bernardo Segni’s Ethica, the Florentine Academy, and the Vernacular in Sixteenth-
Century Italy,” Renaissance Quarterly 3 (2013): 824–65.
131. Gelli, 201.
132. Gelli, 201
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possible to start acquiring them in childhood, men would “more devoutly love 
and defend the teachings of the Christian religion.”133 Gelli goes on to say that 
“Christians who teach their children to read with mercantesca or legends where 
there is nothing to learn should be ashamed.”134 He believes that rote learning 
the Latin words of sacred and philosophical texts without understanding their 
content “is like women croaking or parrots chirruping.”135 The end purpose of 
vulgarizers such as Gelli is not only the dissemination of knowledge, therefore, 
but also making knowledge available to all human beings, who must therefore 
understand and absorb the message conveyed by religion and philosophy. The 
democratization of culture is part of a wider conception according to which the 
accumulation of knowledge is a form of progress that allows human beings to 
avoid mistakes caused by ignorance.136 Preserving culture in the classical lan-
guages is as an aristocratic paradigm that is inhuman and therefore must be 
opposed at all costs. Gelli openly attacks the supporters of this aristocratic con-
spiracy to prevent the vernacular from becoming a language of culture, pointing 
to
the miserliness of the priests and friars who, not content with their part 
of tithes God ordered be allocated to them by law, and wanting to live as 
sumptuously as they do, they keep hidden from us, selling them to us bit 
by bit, or piecemeal, in so doing terrorizing men with a thousand false 
threats that are not written in the law as they interpret them; so that they 
have snatched from the hands of the poor more than half of what they had 
[…] this is an evil that I feel resides not only in the priests, but in everyone: 
indeed there is not a man who does not think of taking money from the 
possessions of others and keeping it as his own. It is true that the priests, 
friars, and notaries, who do it with words, are better at it than others. […] it 
would not be so easy for them [to deceive] if men had better knowledge of 
Holy Scriptures than they have. And the reason why human affairs are not 
translated is likewise the impiety of many doctors and lawyers who want 
to sell us common things; and in order to so, they have come up with this 
133. Gelli, 203.
134. Gelli, 203
135. Gelli, 204.
136. Gelli, 203.
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artful ruse whereby contracts cannot be written in the vernacular, but only 
in their own polished grammar, which they only partly understand and 
others not at all. I am astonished that men have tolerated such conditions, 
under which it is possible to perpetrate a thousand deceptions.137
Priests and friars, or members of the Church generally, along with lawyers and 
jurists, have conspired against the opening up of culture in order to preserve the 
privileges of their caste and exert control over the uneducated classes.138 This is 
a harsh indictment of the political and religious establishment, the subversive-
ness of which did not escape the notice of the censors who forced him to make 
substantial amendments to the more controversial passages.139 Gelli’s position 
here is reminiscent of the words uttered by the miller Domenico Scandella who, 
when sentenced to death by the Inquisition, said, “speaking Latin is a betrayal 
of the poor because in lawsuits the poor do not know what is being said and 
are crushed; and if they want to say four words they need a lawyer.”140 The use 
137. Gelli, 205: “[del]l’avarizia de’ preti e de’ frati, che non bastando loro quella porzione delle decime 
che avevano ordinato loro Iddio per legge, a voler vivo tanto suntuosamente come e’ fanno, ce le tengono 
ascose, e ce le vendono a poco a poco, come si dice a minuto, e in quel modo però che e’ vogliono, 
spaventando gli uomini con mille falsi minacci, i quali non suonan così nella legge come egli interpretano; 
di maniera che egli hanno cavato di mano a’ poveri secolari più che la metà di quel che egli avevano […] 
questo è un male che mi pare che si dia non solamente a i sacerdoti, ma ognuno: anzi non c’è uom che 
pensi ad altro, se non in che modo e’ potesse cavare e danari delle scarselle d’altri, e mettergli nella sua. 
Egli è ben vero che i preti, e frati e i notai, che lo fanno con le parole, son più valenti de gli altri. […] non 
sarebbe venuto lor fatto così agevolmente [ingannare], se gli uomini avessino avuto più cognizione delle 
Scritture Sacre che e’ non hanno. E la cagione che non si traducono l’umane è similmente la impietà di 
molti dottori e avocati, che ci voglion vendere le cose communi; e per poterlo far meglio, hanno trovato 
questo bel ghiribizzo, che i contratti non si possin fare in volgare, ma solamente in quella loro bella 
grammatica, che la intendon poco eglino e manco altri. Io mi meraviglio, che gli uomini abbin mai 
sopportato tanto una cosa simile sotto la quale si può fare mille inganni.”
138. Gelli’s critique cuts deeper than this, though: the only reason why men do not criticize the religious 
authorities is because they do not know the Holy Scriptures. Yet, as Christians, all human beings are 
equals and can therefore criticize and judge both priests and princes, and even point out the mistakes 
that the pope himself “commits as a man and as a Christian” (Opere, 206). Gelli’s position is extreme and 
comes close to the anti-papal views of the Lutherans.
139. Andrew L. De Gaetano, “Tre lettere inedite di G.B. Gelli e la purgazione de ‘I capricci del bottaio,’” 
Giornale storico della letteratura italiana 134 (1957): 298–313.
140. Ginzburg, 12: “Io ho questa opinione, che il parlar latin sia un tradimento de’ poveri, perché nelle 
litte li pover’homini non sano quello si dice et sono strussiati, et se vogliono dir quatro parole bisogna 
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of Latin by the upper classes was seen by the vulgarizers as a means of control-
ling and exerting power over those who had only limited access to culture. The 
vernacular language was therefore perfectly placed to express the most complex 
ideas and to emancipate the people from the dominance of the educated classes, 
under whose yoke they had laboured for centuries. It is in this double sense, 
therefore, that the project to democratize knowledge for the people becomes 
vitally important; and it is in this sense, too, that we can speak of an Aristotle 
for the people.
The overall relationship that was established between Aristotle and the 
people in the Renaissance thanks to vulgarization is captured in the letter 
to Aristotle written by Alexander the Great, which is contained in Plutarch’s 
Parallel Lives.141 The Macedonian king criticizes his teacher for having broadcast 
the knowledge that had once been the prerogative of a few among the com-
mon people and his enemies. References to this anecdote are to be found in the 
works of a number of vulgarizers, including Antonio Brucioli in his preface to 
the translation of Aristotle’s De generatione et corruptione. The most interest-
ing reading of the letter, however, comes from Antonio Tridapale dal Borgo, a 
modest mid-sixteenth-century intellectual whose only claim to fame is the fact 
that he published the first vernacular logic.142 Tridapale shows that underlying 
Alexander’s criticism was the notion that knowledge was a form of power that 
dissipates once it enters the public domain. The question of whether it was right 
for knowledge to have been the exclusive preserve of a small group of people for 
so long if it leads to power and domination over others was a pressing concern 
for vulgarizers. Tridapale, like Gelli, Brucioli, and many other vulgarizers from 
the same period, was clear on this point: knowledge must be available to all; 
therefore, in order to reach as many people as possible, it must be written in the 
vernacular as well as Latin. Alexander the Great’s desire to keep all knowledge for 
himself and thereby maintain his power over other men is therefore inhuman. 
As we have seen, if, as Aristotle asserts, all human beings tend naturally towards 
knowledge, denying them access to knowledge is an inhuman endeavour. For 
this reason, Tridapale, Gelli, and many others state that the highest ambition is 
haver un avocato.”
141. Marianne Pade, The Reception of Plutarch’s Lives in Fifteenth-Century Italy (Copenhagen: Museum 
Tusculanum Press, 2007), 52.
142. Antonio Tridapale dal Borgo, La loica in lingua volgare (Venice: Gherardo, 1547), 2r; Marco Sgarbi, 
The Italian Mind: Vernacular Logic in Renaissance Italy (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 127–53.
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not to conceal all knowledge from the greater part of men, but on the contrary 
to help others gain knowledge of those things that nature has made available to 
us all, even revealing the most difficult and arcane secrets. Hence the need to 
translate Aristotle into the vernacular for the people.
Communication and the spread of knowledge are a value for Aristotle’s 
vulgarizers, and its defence requires a transvaluation of the values that had ac-
companied culture up until that moment. Knowledge is no longer perceived 
as predominantly closed, aristocratic, partly “tied to a vision of the world and 
history that belonged to hermeticism,”143 Pythagoreanism, Platonism, and 
Christianity; it is now more open, “democratic,” and “egalitarian,” and seems 
closer to the conception of the thinkers who vulgarized Aristotle’s works. While 
it is important to avoid over-generalizing, it is nevertheless the case that, in 
terms of opening up knowledge, Aristotle’s vernacular works display some of 
the qualities that are later to be found in some aspects of “modern science.”
For a long time in the Middle Ages, and later into the Renaissance per-
iod, the man of learning was viewed as something akin to a magician who has 
the power to penetrate the inner workings of an infinitely complex reality, the 
secrets of which had to be kept hidden from the common people to avoid its 
debasement.144 Remember the words of Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim: 
“any experience of magic holds the public in contempt, wants to be hidden, 
builds its strength in silence, and is destroyed when broadcast.”145 Thanks pri-
marily to Aristotle’s vulgarizers, but also scientists like Galileo Galilei, secrecy 
in Renaissance Italy generally became an anti-value, whereas sharing and open-
ing up knowledge became a moral imperative.146 Although magic, philosophy, 
143. Paolo Rossi, La nascita della scienza moderna in Europa (Rome-Bari: Laterza 1997), 19. For an 
accurate description of the problem cf. Vittoria Perrone Compagni, “Parlare velato: trasmissione 
esoterica della verità nel Rinascimento,” in La verità in scrittura, ed. Fabio Bazzani, Roberta Lanfredini, 
and Sergio Vitale (Florence: Clinamen, 2013), 73–86.
144. In the Gospel of Matthew, 7, 6 we read: “give not holy things to dogs nor cast not your pearls before 
swine, or they will trample them under their feet and turn and tear you to pieces.” 
145. Cornelio Agrippa, Opera Omnia, vol. 1 (Lyon: Bering, 1550?), 498.
146. On the concept of “openness of knowledge,” see William Eamon, “From the Secrets of Nature to 
Public Knowledge: The Origins of the Concept of Openness in Science,” Minerva 23 (1985): 321–47; 
William Eamon, “From the Secrets of Nature to Public Knowledge,” in Reappraisals of Scientific 
Revolutions, ed. David C. Lindberg and Robert S. Westman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), 333–66; Pamela O. Long, “The Openness of Knowledge: An Ideal and Its Context in 16th-
Century Writings on Mining and Metallurgy,” Technology and Culture 2 (1991): 318–55; Pamela O. 
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and science in the Renaissance are hopelessly entangled,147 in terms of modern 
historiography, their approach to knowledge could hardly be more different. 
Aristotle’s vulgarizers are closest to the ideal conception of knowledge of “mod-
ern science,” and we might even say they were its most immediate and fertile 
precursors. Those who criticized Alessandro Piccolomini for his vulgarizations, 
which perforce appeared to be directed at “uncouth” people and “people de-
void of judgment” were reminded by him of the distinction between intelligent 
people without access to culture who needed educating and people who were 
completely uninterested in knowledge and devoid of any capacity for critical 
thought, who were therefore unsuitable as recipients for his works:
And they are greatly deceived if they think that those who read my works 
are uncouth and so devoid of judgment that they assume that with the 
same amount of concentration and immediacy of understanding that is 
required to read fables and romances, they can tackle matters astrological 
and scientific, almost as if writing in our language necessarily entailed 
giving the same degree of clarity to all subjects. Be it not pleasing to God 
that such ill-fortune should befall this work that it should fall into the 
hands of such uncouth and inept readers that believe such things.148
Piccolomini’s critique is double-edged: those who presume to read scientif-
ic works in the vernacular as if they were fables are uncouth and inept, but 
those who believe that vulgarizations are of a low cultural and doctrinal or-
der just because they are not written in Greek or Latin are even more so. For 
Piccolomini, as for many other contemporary vulgarizers, it is absolutely clear 
Long, Openness, Secrecy, Authorship: Technical Arts and the Culture of Knowledge from Antiquity to the 
Renaissance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 175–243.
147. Brian Vickers, “Introduction,” in Occult & Scientific Mentalities in the Renaissance, ed. Brian Vickers 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 1–55; Paolo Rossi, Il tempo dei maghi. Rinascimento e 
modernità (Milano: Raffaello Cortina, 2006), 103–29.
148. Piccolomini, La prima parte dele theoriche overo speculationi dei pianeti, A1v: “e si ingannano di 
gran lungi, se pensano che le persone che son per leggere li scritti miei, sieno si rozzi, & privi d’ogni 
giuditio, che si stimino, che con quella medesima attenzione, & subita apprensione, con la quale si 
leggano le favole, & le novelle, con la medesima si devin leggere le materie astrologiche, & scientifiche 
cosi fatte, quasi che lo scrivere in lingua nostra habbia de porgere ugualmente ad ogni materia ugual 
chiarezza. Non piaccia a Dio che con si mala fortuna venga fuora questa opera, che l’habbia da venire in 
mano di lettori cosi rozi, & inetti, che questo credino.”
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that this is not a case of casting the pearls of knowledge “before swine,” as a 
certain kind of culture that claimed lordship over knowledge presumed; on the 
contrary, it is a matter of supplying — pro bono publico — a vast public that 
wants to be educated with the knowledge and the means to achieve cultural 
emancipation, not only for the sake of progress but also for the purpose of 
ethical and moral edification.149 This is why the relationship between vernacu-
lar Aristotelianism and the people is an important chapter in the intellectual 
history of the Renaissance.
149. On this period of transition, see William Eamon, Science and the Secrets of Nature: Books of Secrets 
in Medieval and Early Modern Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 319–50; Rossi, Il 
tempo dei maghi, 275–304.
